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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **Marcus Tullius Cicero**, the greatest of Roman orators, was born at Arpinum in 106 B.C. His family was of equestrian rank, but had never held any office in Rome. Cicero was accordingly a *novus homo*, and his struggle to obtain the praetorship and consulship was on that account made harder. He was sent while still a young lad to Rome, and there studied under the best masters, such as Archias. In B.C. 91 he assumed the *toga virilis*, and then attended the lectures of orators and lawyers. He was entrusted by his father to the special care of Mucius Scaevola the Augur, from whose side he hardly ever departed. At that time one of the easiest methods of obtaining fame and success was by means of oratory, and as Cicero had a natural talent for this art, he cultivated it in preference to devoting himself to a military life. However, he served, as was usual with young Romans who aspired to public office, one campaign, and this happened to be in the Social War (89 B.C.) under Cn. Pompeius Strabo (the father of Pompey the Great). For the next six years he took no part in public affairs, but devoted his time to the study of rhetoric and the various schools of philosophy; from Phaedrus he learned the Epicurean system, from Philo that of the New Academy, and from Diodotus that of the Stoics.

The first of his extant speeches is that *Pro P. Quinctio*, which was delivered in 81 B.C. Two years later, in a criminal trial, he defended Sextus Roscius Amerinus, whose accuser was Chrysogonus, the powerful freedman of Sulla.

It was very bold in Cicero to undertake this defence, but his boldness was equalled by his eloquence, and his success on this occasion placed him at once amongst the best orators of the day. Ill-health obliged him to retire to Athens, where he continued his study of rhetoric and philosophy for two years, returned to Rome in 77 B.C., and was elected quaestor in 76 B.C. He served this office in Sicily, and acquired golden opinions from the natives through his integrity, impartiality, and self-denial. In 74 B.C. he returned to Rome, and again devoted himself to his profession as an advocate. In 70 B.C. he undertook the impeachment of Verres, who was charged by the Sicilians with having been guilty of misgovernment, oppression, and extortion during his quaestorship in Sicily from 73-71 B.C. Hortensius, the consul-elect for the following year, was Verres's advocate, and on behalf of his client was anxious that the trial should be delayed until the next year, when the presiding praetor would be more favourably disposed to the defendant. Cicero frustrated this attempt by getting his evidence ready in half the time allowed, and by opening his case very briefly and proceeding at once to the examination of his witnesses. The *In Verrem* as we possess it was not the speech he actually delivered, but a speech which he published after the trial as representing what he would have said had the case run the usual course. The result of Cicero's onslaught was that Verres departed at once into exile without even attempting a defence.

In 69 B.C. Cicero was aedile, in 66 B.C. praetor, and in 63 B.C. consul. During his consulship he had to deal with the famous conspiracy of Catiline. In his efforts to crush it Cicero imprisoned some of the participators in the plot, and ordered them to be put to death without being tried before the people. For his services on this occasion he received the thanks of the whole people, and was dignified by the name of *pater patriae.* But his enemy Clodius, by calling public attention to the illegal execution of the conspirators, brought about the orator's banishment in 58 B.C. Cicero's friends actively exerted themselves to procure his return, and succeeded in their efforts in 57 B.C. In 53 B.C. he was admitted into the College of Augurs, and in the

following year acted as proconsul and commanded in the province of Cicilia, where he conducted some successful military operations.

It has been stated above that Cicero was a *novus homo*, and as such would naturally belong to the democratic party. From the date of his consulship, however, he seems to have attached himself to the *optimates*, or aristocratic party, and accordingly at the outbreak of the civil war in 49 B.C., after some hesitation, he joined Pompey, but subsequently, after the battle of Pharsalia in 48 B.C., he was reconciled to Caesar. After the death of Caesar, 44 B.C., an open rupture ensued between him and Antony, and Cicero gave vent to his anger and indignation in the famous "Philippic Orations," fourteen speeches, the finest and most renowned of which is the second. From the beginning of 43 B.C. until the end of April Cicero was in the height of his glory, but before the end of that year, in the proscription that followed upon the formation of the triumvirate, Cicero's name was, on the suggestion of Antony, which was not opposed by Octavianus, put in the list of those doomed to immediate destruction. Soldiers were at once sent in pursuit, and although his attendants wished to offer opposition, Cicero forbade them, and surrendered to his pursuers, by whom he was immediately killed.

In the foregoing sketch no mention has been made of Cicero's philosophical works, which were both numerous and important. His activity in this direction begins from his exile in 57 B.C.; in 55 B.C. he produced the *De Oratore*, in 54 B.C. the *De Re Publica*, and in 52 B.C. the *De Legibus*. This period of activity was followed by five years (51 to 46 B.C.) of comparative rest, but in 46 B.C. he wrote the *Hortensius* or *De Philosophia*, a treatise now lost, in addition to the *Partitiones Oratoriae*, the *Brutus* or *De Claris Oratoribus*, and the *Orator*. During the years 45 and 44 B.C. he wrote the *De Consolatione*, on the occasion of the death of his daughter Tullia; the *Academica*, an account of the new Academic Philosophy, which maintained that there was no such thing as certainty—we must be content with probability; the *Disputationes Tusculanae*, treating of happiness and morality; the *De Natura Deorum*,

the *De Divinatione* (on the subject whether gods communicate with men by means of augury, etc.), the *De Senectute*, the *De Amicitia*, the *De Fato* (an account of Fate and Freewill), the *Paradoxa* (an account of certain paradoxical opinions of the Stoics), the *De Officiis* (a treatise on Duty), and the **De Finibus**, on the Highest Good.

So far we have dealt with Cicero's speeches and philosophical works. In addition to these must be mentioned (1) his Letters, of which he wrote a vast number, and of which more than 800 are preserved; (2) his poetical works, which were very poor in quality though not small in quantity—his chief poem was written on the subject of his consulship; and (3) his historical and miscellaneous works, *e.g.* a prose account of his consulship, an account of his policy immediately previous to his consulship, etc.

§ 2. The **De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum**, a discussion, in five books, on the subject of the limits of good and evil, is one of the most polished and elaborated of Cicero's philosophical works. The discussion is in the form of dialogues between Cicero and various friends, but the dialogues are not all supposed to take place at the same time; and, while Cicero takes a chief part in all of them, care is taken that the other interlocutors are dead at the time when Cicero published the treatise, which was probably in August, 45.

Since meeting Caesar on his return from the East in B.C. 47, he had been on good terms with him, and had been able to use his influence on behalf of friends; but, though admiring Caesar's magnanimity, he would not take part with him. He endeavoured to find consolation for the ruin of his old party and for his own family troubles (*e.g.* the divorce from his first wife Terentia and the death of his daughter Tullia) in social intercourse and in literary labours. Of their many fruits (see foot of page 9), the *De Finibus* is one of the best.

The scene of Books I. and II. is laid at Cicero's villa in Cumae, in the year 50 B.C., the speakers being **Cicero, C. Valerius Triarius**, and **L. Manlius Torquatus**, praetor elect.

In Book I. Torquatus enunciates the doctrines of Epicurus in response to an attack made upon them by Cicero. (In one of his letters Cicero calls this book *Torquatus*, because of the important part taken by Torquatus in the discussion.) Book II. gives the reply of the Stoics, and their arguments against the whole system of Epicurus: this takes the form of a dialogue between Cicero and Torquatus.

The scene of the second discussion, which comprises Books III. and IV., is laid in the villa of Lucullus at Tusculum in the year 52 B.C., Cicero using the arguments of the New Academy against the Stoic principles of Cato. In Book III. Cicero maintains that there is no real difference between the Stoics on the one hand, and the Old Academy and Peripatetics on the other. Cato at once asserts that the Stoic doctrines are quite distinct and immeasurably superior. Cicero's reply to Cato is contained in Book IV.

The third discussion, as contained in Book V., is earliest in point of time, and is supposed to take place in Athens in the year 79 B.C. The speakers are Cicero, his brother Quintus, his cousin Lucius, M. Pomponius Atticus and M. Pupius Piso. This last gives a full description of the doctrines of the Peripatetics (as inculcated by Aristotle and his followers); and Cicero brings forward the objections of the Stoics against these doctrines. The book closes with Piso's reply.

It is to be noticed that in none of these discussions does Cicero profess to enunciate his own philosophical convictions. In the first and third discussions (which are in order of date the third and first discussions) he gives the objections of the Stoics against the Epicureans and Peripatetics respectively; and in the second discussion (third in date) he refutes the opinion of the Stoics by means of those of the New Academy. From this fact and from others we are led to infer that, while Cicero had the highest appreciation of the Stoical system, in his own mind he inclined more closely to the doctrines of the New Academy, which doubted the possibility of attaining absolute truth and was content with probability. The ethical principles of the two systems were very similar.

§ 3. **Sources of the Treatise.**—The authority on the subject matter of Book I. is Diogenes Laertius' account of Epicurus. (Diogenes Laertius lived about the second century A.D., and wrote a history of philosophy in ten books, the last of which deals with Epicurus and his philosophy at some considerable length.) Cicero himself may have made use of: (1) Epicurus' Epistle to Menoeceus; (2) his περὶ κυριῶν δοξῶν—some passages in the *De Finibus* are translated almost word for word from these Greek originals; and (3) the lectures of Phaedrus and Zeno, which he had himself attended (Book I., § 16 and note). The authorities for the other four books of the De Finibus are: (1) Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς; (2) the writings and oral communications of Posidonius; (3) Chrysippus περὶ τελῶν; (4) Carneades; (5) Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Antiochus of Ascalon; and (6) Diodotus. (For these names see Biographical Appendix.) In Book I. of the *De Finibus* there is no allusion—no pointed allusion at least—to Aristotle's *Ethics*. Yet Cicero can scarcely have been ignorant of the two dissertations on ἡδονή in Books VII. and X., or of friendship in Books VIII. and IX., of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It seems strange, too, that Cicero should make no direct reference to Plato's views on ἡδονή in the *Republic*, the *Philebus*, or elsewhere. It may be noted here that the latter looked with disfavour on pleasure, both because it seems to have no natural limits, and because it consists in a transition from one state to another, thus appearing to him to be *unreal*. Aristotle took a more moderate view. Regarding pleasure as something "which accompanies the activity of a natural faculty," he thought it might be either good or bad, varying with the faculty exercised. Cicero, however, hardly touches this psychological side of pleasure.

§ 4. **Summary of Philosophy down to the time of Cicero.**—In order to understand the philosophic teaching of the *De Finibus*, it is not necessary to go back farther than Plato for our starting-point. It may be as well, however, just to state that previous to Plato there were three main schools of philosophy:—

I. THE IONIC, which attempted to trace back the

whole world to a single principle ("Monists"), included amongst its exponents *Thales* of Miletus (640-550 B.C.), *Anaximenes* (circ. 570 B.C.), and *Heraclitus* of Ephesus (cir. 513 B.C.), who respectively held that (1) water, (2) air, (3) fire, was the single original element from which everything was made and into which everything was turned.

Two later thinkers are sometimes attached to this school. (1) *Anaxagoras* of Clazomenae (499-427 B.C.) belongs to this school; but instead of looking—as his predecessors had done—for any original element, from which without external aid all things arose, he taught that everything in the world was ordered and regulated by a divine mind or intelligence (Νοῦς). (2) *Empedocles* (circ. B.C. 440) tried to put together fragments of previous thought in a new way, and is consequently called an "eclectic." He held that from the action of love and hate on the four primordial elements—earth, fire, air, water—all forms of life came by a sort of evolution.

II. THE ELEATIC—to which is due the distinction between the "real" and the "phenomenal," and between perception (αἴσθησις) and thought (νοῦς)—founded by *Xenophanes* of Colophon (fl. 540-500 B.C.), who fled to Elea, or Velia, a Greek colony on the west coast of Lucania, when his native land was conquered by the Persians. He disliked the current anthropomorphism, and held that the whole of Nature was God; and this doctrine was developed by his successors Parmenides and Zeno. *Parmenides*, a native of Elea (fl. 460 B.C.), seems to have settled in Athens and become acquainted with Socrates. He insisted on the unity of things (τὸ ἕν), but, unlike Xenophanes, did not envisage it as God. Plato was largely influenced by him. *Zeno* of Elea (not to be confounded with Zeno of Citium, the Stoic) taught that all knowledge and all assertions were relative—thus people say a peck of corn by falling to the ground makes a noise, but a millionth part of a peck of corn makes no noise by falling to the ground. These assertions are not both absolutely true, but only relatively true. He is called εὑρετὴς τῆς διαλεκτικῆς (Inventor of the Method of Inquiry).

III. THE ITALIC, founded by *Pythagoras*, who was born in Samos about 580 B.C., but lived mostly at Croton.

Among his teachers were Thales and Anaximander. He travelled extensively in Egypt, Phoenicia, and Babylon, the history and state of which countries modified his philosophical system. He studied deeply the sciences of arithmetic and geometry, and attached to abstract number a mysterious importance which his followers, the Pythagoreans, increased and developed. He had also lofty ethical and political views—especially insisting on purity of life and duties to friends; in which, in the importance attached to number, and in the distinction between *τὸ πέρας* and *τὸ ἄπειρον*, he largely influenced later Greek thought, particularly that of Plato. He also held the doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls. He was, however, not merely a thinker, but also a doer. Believing that he had a divine mission to perform in disseminating his views, he formed religious brotherhoods in Croton. These had made ramifications throughout Magna Graecia; but, on becoming political organisations, they were suppressed in the democratic interest. They survived merely as a philosophical sect.

No separate account need be given of *Socrates* (469-399 B.C.), as, although his teaching had a most powerful and practical effect on his contemporaries and a very lasting influence on succeeding thought, it is best seen as developed by his disciples Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Zeno, an account of whom will be found in the biographical appendix under their respective names. These four disciples were the founders respectively of the ACADEMICS, PERIPATETICS, EPICUREANS, and STOICS. In addition to these four principal schools, there were three minor schools which arose out of the teaching of Socrates, viz. (1) the MEGARIC, founded by *Euclides* of Megara, and called also the *Dialectic*, or *Eristic*, which laid great stress on the importance of discussion and logic; (2) the CYRENAIC, founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, in Africa; and (3) the CYNIC, founded by *Antisthenes*, an Athenian, who taught in the "Cynosarges," a gymnasium at Athens, from the name of which his followers were called Cynics, though some people say it was on account of their dog-like (*κυνικὸς, κύων*), uncivilised habits. Diogenes of Sinope was one of the

most famous members of this school (See Notes, § 6). For the Cyrenaics see "Aristippus."

The direct followers of Plato, as an Academic, were subsequently divided into three schools: (1) *The Old Academy*, which comprised Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor, Xenocrates, and others, all of whom followed Plato's doctrines very closely; (2) *The Middle Academy*, which began with Arcesilaus (fl. 220 B.C.), who especially inquired into the grounds of knowledge, and as a result approximated somewhat to the views of the Pyrrhonists or Sceptics, who looked upon all knowledge as doubtful; and (3) *The New Academy*, founded by Carneades (fl. 160 B.C.), which accentuated the tendency of the Middle Academy towards doubt and hesitation, and asserted that with truth a certain amount of error was always combined. Cicero's personal views probably approach nearer to the doctrines of the New Academy than to those of any other system; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say (as Crutwell remarks) that he was a Stoic in his ethics, a New Academician in his logic, and in other respects a Platonist.

Philosophy first made its appearance in Italy as a recognised study in about the second century B.C. From the outset it was looked upon with disfavour by the Roman Government, (1) because it produced a disbelief in the state religion, (2) because it tended to make men lead a private instead of a public life. In 161 B.C. a decree was passed banishing all philosophers from Rome; but in 155 B.C. an embassy consisting of *Diogenes* the Stoic, *Critolaus* the Peripatetic and *Carneades* the New Academician was received at Rome, and these philosophers soon obtained a multitude of pupils. The systems that found most favour may be ranged thus in respect of influence—Stoics, Epicureans, the Academy. The Stoic system, based on the principle that virtue was the only good, was congenial to the national character, and many great men (*e.g.* Laelius and Scaevola) professed it. The Epicurean system, resting, as it did, on the principle that pleasure was the *summum bonum*, was advocated previously to Cicero's time only by second-rate persons: it was repugnant to the old Roman view of a self-sacrificing political activity. The Academy, which taught

that nothing could be known, and which occupied itself by balancing opinions first one way and then another, was especially congenial to orators and advocates—of which class there were a large number at Rome.

Such were the leading thinkers of antiquity down to the time of Cicero: such, in the barest outline, was their thought. In order to get a firm grasp of the history of the philosophical question which forms the subject of this book, Mr. Mayor's *Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero* (Pitt Press, 3*s.* 6*d.*) should be consulted. Perhaps the relation of Roman philosophising to Greek philosophy at its best, could hardly be put better than in Mommsen's words. "Even the philosophic activity of the Hellenic mind had, when it began to exert influence on Rome, already left the epoch of productive speculation far behind it, and had arrived at the stage at which not only is there no origination of really new systems, but even the power of apprehending the more perfect of the older systems begins to wane, and men restrict themselves to the repetition, soon passing into the scholastic tradition, of the less complete dogmas of their predecessors. The enchanted draught of speculation, always dangerous, is, when stale, certain poison."

§ 5. **Analysis of De Finibus, Book I.**—Chaps. I-IV.—Introduction, dedication to Brutus. Cicero's intention to treat, in Latin, subjects already handled by Greek philosophers. (§ 1) This intention is disapproved of by four classes of people: (1) those who oppose philosophy altogether; (2) those who think only a very moderate amount of time should be given to it (§ § 2, 3); (3) those who prefer the Greek originals (§§ 4-10); and (4) those who say this study is unworthy of a prominent Roman statesman (§§ 10-12). Cicero answers all these objections, and concludes by affirming that the importance of his subject—viz. what is the chief good, what is the end and object of a good life?—imposes upon him the necessity of investigating it and bringing it before his fellow-citizens.

Chaps. V-VIII.—To begin with the easiest, Cicero first takes the views of Epicurus, and reproduces a discussion

which he had formerly had with Torquatus and Triarius at his estate at Cumae.

Cicero points out the defects in (1) the natural philosophy (§§ 17-21), (2) the logic or dialectic (§ 22), and (3) the ethics of Epicurus' system (§§ 23-26). In natural philosophy (*e.g.* his atomic theory) he has nothing original, but has borrowed everything from Democritus and others: when at times he has not borrowed outright but has tried to improve their theories, instead of making them better he has made them worse. He had no skill in arguing, and laid down no rules for the help of others. He made pleasure the chief good, a view which was both short-sighted and wanting in originality.

Cicero puts these views in an aggressive shape so as to make Torquatus defend his master: Torquatus accepts the challenge, and prefers to adopt a continuous speech rather than a dialogue (§§ 26-28).

Chap. IX-XXI.—A discussion of Epicurus' teaching as expounded by Torquatus.

Chap. IX.—Pleasure is the chief good and pain the chief evil. Experience shows that every animal from the moment of its birth seeks pleasure as the chief good and avoids pain as the chief evil. This is a matter of perception or experience, and requires no reasoning or argument. But although it stands in need of no argument, arguments can be brought forward, and Torquatus thinks it better so to do.

Chap. X.—No one avoids pleasure because it is pleasure, and no one seeks pain because it is pain; but people avoid or give up some pleasures in order to obtain greater pleasures, and seek and endure some pains in order to avoid greater pains. So the elder Torquatus risked death, but it was in order to obtain glory and the affection of his countrymen; he ordered his son to be executed, but it was in order to provide for the safety of his fellow-citizens, on which depended his own safety.

Chap. XI.—Epicurus' doctrine of pleasure, instead of being voluptuous and effeminate, is dignified and temperate. Pleasure is not merely active, causing a pleasant sensation by working on the feelings, but is also inactive or restful,

as when all pain is removed. This latter form of pleasure is the greatest of all pleasures. There is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain; what people call the intermediate state, *i.e.* when man is free from every sort of pain, is really the state of the highest pleasure.

Chap. XII.—One proof that pleasure is the highest good and pain the chief evil can be seen in the example of a man who is enjoying great uninterrupted pleasures, both mental and bodily, without any prospect or threat of pain. Nothing could be more desirable than the condition of this man, and nothing is more to be avoided than the condition of the man who is tortured by the greatest pains. To live pleasurably is the highest good, or τέλος as the Greeks call it, *i.e.* the ultimate end or object of life.

Chap. XIII.—The highest good is not virtue, but what virtue produces, *i.e.* pleasure. We esteem the skill of a physician or a pilot not from love of the abstract sciences of medicine or navigation, but on account of the good or pleasure they confer on us. This applies to each in the commonly received tetrad of virtues. So (*a*) *wisdom* is not to be desired for its own sake, but because of the pleasure it brings by expelling sorrow and banishing vehement desires.

Here (§§ 45, 46) is given Epicurus' threefold division of desires or appetites into (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural but not necessary, and (3) neither natural nor necessary.

Chap. XIV.—Similarly (*b*) *temperance* is not to be sought for its own sake, but because it brings peace to the mind and gives pleasure. Temperance is to be desired not because it avoids pleasures, but because, by giving up some, it procures greater enjoyment.

Chap. XV.—So, too, (*c*) *courage* is cultivated not for itself, but in order that we may live without care, fear, or annoyance. The lofty mind has no fear of death, as by means thereof it can free itself at any moment from pain. Cowardice is avoided as the parent of pain, and courage desired as the author of pleasure.

Chap. XVI.—The same remarks apply to (*d*) *justice*,

which, like wisdom, temperance and courage, is indissolubly connected with pleasure. The unjust man's mind is always disturbed and never tranquil: he is constantly suspected and constantly in fear of discovery. Moreover, law and public opinion punish injustice. The liberal and just man gains goodwill and affection, which are the two most powerful ingredients towards producing a tranquil mind. Dishonesty is to be avoided both on account of the evils or pains that attend it, and also on account of the harassing trouble it causes the mind.

CHAP. XVII.—The *cause* or *origin* of pleasure and pain. They begin in, and are referred to, the body; but the pleasures and pains of the mind are more important and powerful than those of the body, since the former are concerned with things past and future as well as present, the latter are concerned only with things present.

If pleasure is taken away, pain does not necessarily succeed; but, on the other hand, if pain is taken away, pleasure must necessarily follow. We instinctively dwell with pleasure and delight on the recollection of good fortune, but bury past adversity in oblivion.

CHAP. XVIII.—A man cannot live a pleasant and agreeable life unless he lives an honourable, just and wise life; and he cannot live an honourable, just and wise life without also living a pleasant and agreeable life. A quarrelsome and discordant mind cannot taste pure pleasure nor enjoy rest or quiet.

The pleasure of life is marred by bodily disease, but still more by mental disease, *i.e.* melancholy, superstition and fear of death.

There is no fool who is happy, and no wise man who is not happy. This doctrine of Epicurus is more true and forcible than that of the Stoics, who assert that the imaginary shadow τὸ καλόν is the only good, and that virtue, relying on this principle of honour, stands in need of no pleasure.

CHAP. XIX.—The wise man, according to Epicurus, is always happy; he has no fear of death or of the gods; he always enjoys more pleasure than pain; he remembers the pleasures of the past, and enjoys the present, and fortune

has but little power over him. Such a man enjoys more pleasure from our limited life here than from an eternity of life.

The art of *dialectic*, which treats of the meaning of words and the mere sequence of argument, is comparatively unimportant: but natural philosophy—by which the nature of all things is known, by which fear, superstition and ignorance are dissipated, and by which our morals are improved—is, on the other hand, of the greatest importance. Moreover, dialectic is absolutely unnecessary if we know the nature of all things; and such knowledge can be obtained through the senses. Those who deny the possibility of anything being known by the senses, deny the possibility of all knowledge, and so cannot know that nothing can be known.

The study of natural philosophy produces courage, tranquillity of mind, temperance and the power of distinguishing truth from falsehood.

Chap. XX.—*Friendship.*—Epicurus states that for man's happiness nothing is more important and delightful than friendship. His belief in this principle is proved by his own life and conduct.

Three views held by Epicureans: (1) that of Epicurus himself—That we ought to seek after our own pleasure rather than seek after that which is purely and solely the pleasure of our friends. But the pleasure of our friends is almost always a pleasure to us; and friendship, like all the other virtues, *e.g.* wisdom, temperance, courage and justice, cannot be separated from pleasure. Accordingly, the stability of friendship is strengthened, and not weakened, by this view. The wise man feels towards his friend as towards himself.

(2) That the first desire to establish intimacy arises from a desire of pleasure, but such great affection is ripened that afterwards friendship is desired for its own sake, without any idea of advantage or pleasure.

(3) That wise men agree not to love their friend less than themselves. This obviously causes people to live pleasantly.

Chap. XXI.—We ought to be thankful to Epicurus for

having taught that pleasure is the chief good, and for having thus led all men into a peaceful and happy life. As for the charge of his not being a learned man, he considered no learning necessary except what conduced to the attainment of a happy life. These are the doctrines of Epicurus as understood by Torquatus. The latter asks Cicero to criticise.

NOTE.—The text adopted is that of Teubner, and the editors are under deep obligation to the commentaries of Holstein and Boeckel. The grammar referred to in the notes is the Student's Latin Grammar, by Smith and Hall, a copy of which the reader should always have at hand while studying this book. In most cases some account of persons mentioned in the text will be found in the notes upon the paragraph in which they occur; but where a name occurs several times, it has been put in the short biographical appendix at the end of the book

CICERO

DE FINIBUS, I.

I. 1. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum, quae summis ingeniis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sermone tractavissent, ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet, philosophari. Quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. Postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. 2. Contra quos omnis dicendum breviter existimo; quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro, quo a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. Qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi veritus, ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse. Qui autem, si maxime hoc placeat, moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo, quod semel admissum coërceri reprimique non potest, ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis, qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his, qui rebus infinitis

modum constituant in reque eo meliore, quo maior sit, mediocritatem desiderent. 3. Sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea sed fruenda etiam est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus investigandi veri, nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defetigatio turpis est, cum id, quod quaeritur, sit pulcherrimum. Etenim si delectamur, cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus, qui ab eo nos abducat? sin laboramus, quis est, qui alienae modum statuat industriae? Nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult

Fodere aút arare aut áliquid ferre dénique

(non enim illum ab industria, sed ab illiberali labore deterret), sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor.

II. 4. Iis igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina scripta dicunt contemnere. In quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum iidem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. Quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se iisdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius, Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Menandri legam? 5. A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii mihi legendam putem, de quo Licinus: "*Ferreum scriptorem*"! Verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. Rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poëtis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. Mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. An

Utinám ne in nemore . . . . .

nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 6. Quid, si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis? Nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. Quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? Legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. Quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei num desistunt de iisdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? Quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis iisdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur?

III. 7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poëtae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Menandro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. Utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. Facete is quidem, sicut alia; sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris.

8. Ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. Quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. Res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore salutatus Athenis Albucius. 9. Quem quidem locum cum multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola:

Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum,
Municipem Ponti, Tritanni, centurionum,
Praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque
Maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis,
Id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto:
"Χαῖρε," *inquam,* "*Tite!*" *lictores, turma omnis cohorsque:*
"Χαῖρε, *Tite!*" *Hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus.*

10. Sed iure Mucius. Ego autem mirari satis non queo, unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. Non est omnino hic docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. Quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poëtis, postea quidem quam fuit, quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit?

IV. Ego vero, quoniam forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque

possum, in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 11. Qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aequi esse debent, quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini e nostris, et scribentur fortasse, plura, si vita suppetet; et tamen, qui diligenter haec, quae de philosophia litteris mandamus, legere assueverit, iudicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora. Quid est enim in vita tantopere quaerendum quam cum omnia in philosophia, tum id, quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda, quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? Qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alienum putet eius esse dignitatis, quam mihi quisque tribuat, quid in omni munere vitae optimum et verissimum sit, exquirere? 12. An, partus ancillae sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter principes civitatis, P. Scaevolam, M'.que Manilium, ab iisque M. Brutus dissentiet (quod et acutum genus est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta reliquaque eiusdem generis et legimus libenter et legemus); haec, quae vitam omnem continent, neglegentur? Nam, ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec uberiora certe sunt. Quamquam id quidem licebit iis existimare, qui legerint. Nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur, sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur, persecuti sumus.

V. 13. Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat in medium Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est: quam

a nobis sic intelleges expositam, ut ab ipsis, qui eam disciplinam probant, non soleat accuratius explicari. Verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. Accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, in primis gravis et doctus adulescens, ei disputationi interesset. 14. Nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, pauca primo inter nos de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium, deinde Torquatus: Quoniam nacti te, inquit, sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse, quae pertinerent ad bene beateque vivendum. Sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. Nam illud quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea, quae senserit ille, tibi non vera videantur. 15. Vide quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. Oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane, quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner, si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. Re mihi non aeque satisfacit, et quidem locis pluribus. Sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus. Quam ob rem tandem, inquit, non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo, quae dicat ille, bene noris. 16. Nisi mihi Phaedrum, inquam, mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt. Atque eos, quos nominavi, cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret, cotidieque inter nos ea, quae audiebamus, conferebamus, neque

erat umquam controversia, quid ego intellegerem, sed quid probarem.

VI. 17. Quid igitur est? inquit; audire enim cupio, quid non probes. Principio, inquam, in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus; Democritea dicit perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur. Ille atomos quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem, censet in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec infimum nec medium nec intimum nec extremum sit, ita ferri, ut concursionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficiantur ea, quae sint quaeque cernantur, omnia, eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio, sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire. 18. Epicurus autem, in quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. Quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum, quae materia sit, ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum, quae vis sit, quae quidque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi reliquerunt. Sed hoc commune vitium; illae Epicuri propriae ruinae: censet enim eadem illa individua et solida corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam, hunc naturalem esse omnium corporum motum. 19. Deinde ibidem homo acutus, cum illud occurreret, si omnia deorsus e regione ferrentur et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore ut atomus altera alteram posset attingere, † itaque attulit rem commenticiam: declinare dixit atomum perpaulum, quo nihil posset fieri minus; ita effici complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones atomorum inter se, ex quo efficeretur mundus omnesque partes mundi, quaeque in eo essent. Quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem, quod vult. Nam et ipsa declinatio ad libidinem fingitur (ait enim declinare atomum sine causa; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri quicquam sine causa dicere), et illum motum naturalem

omnium ponderum, ut ipse constituit, e regione inferiorem locum petentium sine causa eripuit atomis nec tamen id, cuius causa haec finxerat, assecutus est. 20. Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullae umquam cohaerescent, sive aliae declinabunt, aliae suo nutu recte ferentur, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur, deinde eadem illa atomorum, in quo etiam Democritus haeret, turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit. Ne illud quidem physici, credere aliquid esse minimum; quod profecto numquam putavisset, si a Polyaeno, familiari suo, geometrica discere maluisset quam illum etiam ipsum dedocere. Sol Democrito magnus videtur, quippe homini erudito in geometriaque perfecto, huic pedalis fortasse; tantum enim esse censet, quantus videtur, vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem. 21. Ita, quae mutat, ea corrumpit, quae sequitur, sunt tota Democriti, atomi, inane, imagines, quae εἴδωλα nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus; infinitio ipsa, quam ἀπειρίαν vocant, tota ab illo est, tum innumerabiles mundi, qui et oriantur et intereant cotidie. Quae etsi mihi nullo modo probantur, tamen Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus esset, nollem vituperatum.

VII. 22. Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική dicitur, iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet, non, quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit, non, qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur, ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat. . . . 23. Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem et dolorem. Ad haec, et quae sequamur, et quae fugiamus, refert omnia. Quod quamquam Aristippi est a

Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eius modi esse iudico, ut nihil homine videatur indignius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. Ac fieri potest, ut errem, sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenit, aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem. Quod vero securi percussit filium privavisse se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii. 24. Quid? T. Torquatus, is qui consul cum Cn. Octavio fuit, cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit, quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat, ut eum Macedonum legatis accusantibus, quod pecunias praetorem in provincia cepisse arguerent, causam apud se dicere iuberet reque ex utraque parte audita pronuntiaret eum non talem videri fuisse in imperio, quales eius maiores fuissent, et in conspectum suum venire vetuit, numquid tibi videtur de voluptatibus suis cogitavisse? Sed ut omittam pericula, labores, dolorem etiam, quem optimus quisque pro patria et pro suis suscipit, ut non modo nullam captet, sed etiam praetereat omnes voluptates, dolores denique quosvis suscipere malit quam deserere ullam officii partem, ad ea, quae hoc non minus declarant, sed videntur leviora, veniamus. 25. Quid tibi, Torquate, quid huic Triario litterae, quid historiae cognitioque rerum, quid poëtarum evolutio, quid tanta tot versuum memoria voluptatis affert? Nec mihi illud dixeris: "Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis." Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus aut quisquam eorum, qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista didicisset. Et quod quaeritur saepe, cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit, quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et

honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. Homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem everti, si ita res se habeat. Nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda. Haec igitur Epicuri non probo, inquam. De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior (est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus, quas qui tenent, eruditi appellantur) aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum.

VIII. Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem, quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter arridens: Tu quidem, inquit, totum Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. Quid ei reliquisti, nisi te, quoquo modo loqueretur, intellegere, quid diceret? Aliena dixit in physicis nec ea ipsa, quae tibi probarentur; si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit: disserendi artem nullam habuit; voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. Addidisti ad extremum etiam indoctum fuisse. 27. Fieri, inquam, Triari, nullo pacto potest, ut non dicas, quid non probes eius, a quo dissentias. Quid enim me prohiberet Epicureum esse, si probarem, quae ille diceret? cum praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset. Quam ob rem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones non sunt vituperandae; maledicta, contumeliae, tum iracundiae, contentiones concertationesque in disputando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri solent. 28. Tum Torquatus: Prorsus, inquit, assentior; neque enim disputari sine reprehensione nec cum iracundia aut pertinacia recte disputari potest. Sed ad haec, nisi molestum est, habeo quae velim. An me, inquam, nisi te audire vellem, censes haec dicturum fuisse? Utrum igitur, inquit,

percurri omnem Epicuri disciplinam placet, an de una voluptate quaeri, de qua omne certamen est? Tuo vero id quidem, inquam, arbitratu. Sic faciam igitur, inquit: unam rem explicabo, eamque maximam, de physicis alias, et quidem tibi et declinationem istam atomorum et magnitudinem solis probabo et Democriti errata ab Epicuro reprehensa et correcta permulta. Nunc dicam de voluptate, nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen, quae te ipsum probaturum esse confidam. Certe, inquam, pertinax non ero tibique, si mihi probabis ea, quae dices, libenter assentiar. 29. Probabo, inquit, modo ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis. Sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari. Ut placet, inquam. Tum dicere exorsus est.

IX. Primum igitur, inquit, sic agam, ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituam, quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. Quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum; quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. Hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolorem, idque instituit docere sic: 30. Omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri haec putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce; quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem; altera occulta quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta iudicari.

Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est, quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit, a natura ipsa iudicari. Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? 31. Sunt autem quidam e nostris, qui haec subtilius velint tradere et negent satis esse, quid bonum sit aut quid malum, sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. Itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem, ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum aspernandum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur, cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

X. 32. Sed ut perspiciatis, unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam eaque ipsa, quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt, explicabo. Nemo enim ipsam voluptatem, quia voluptas sit, aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos, qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt; neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quia non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit laboriosam, nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit, qui in ea voluptate velit esse, quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum, qui dolorem eum fugiat, quo voluptas nulla pariatur? 33. At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos ducimus, qui blanditiis

praesentium voluptatum deleniti atque corrupti, quos dolores et quas molestias excepturi sint, occaecati cupiditate non provident, similique sunt in culpa, qui officia deserunt mollitia animi, id est laborum et dolorum fuga. Et harum quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. Nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio, cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id, quod maxime placeat, facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum hic tenetur a sapiente dilectus, ut aut reiciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut preferendis doloribus asperiores repellat. 34. Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est cur verear, ne ad eam non possim accommodare Torquatos nostros? quos tu paulo ante cum memoriter, tum etiam erga nos amice et benivole collegisti, nec me tamen laudandis maioribus meis corrupisti, nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. Quorum facta quem ad modum, quaeso, interpretaris? Sicine eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum fecisse aut in liberos atque in sanguinem suum tam crudelis fuisse, nihil ut de utilitatibus, nihil ut de commodis suis cogitarent? At id ne ferae quidem faciunt, ut ita ruant itaque turbent, ut, earum motus et impetus quo pertineant, non intellegamus; tu tam egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa? 35. Quae fuerit causa, mox videro; interea hoc tenebo, si ob aliquam causam ista, quae sine dubio praeclara sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis per se ipsam causam non fuisse.—Torquem detraxit hosti.—Et quidem se texit, ne interiret. —At magnum periculum adiit.—In oculis quidem exercitus. —Quid ex eo est consecutus?—Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.—Filium morte multavit—Si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam

importuno tamque crudeli; sin, ut dolore suo sanciret militaris imperii disciplinam exercitumque in gravissimo bello animadversionis metu contineret, saluti prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam. 36. Atque haec ratio late patet. In quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento aliquo, sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo dilectu rerum, quem modo dixi, constituto, ut aut voluptates omittantur maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia.

XI. 37. Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum sit. Erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. Nunc autem explicabo, voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum intellegaturque, ea, quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina, quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. Nam quoniam, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est, ut omne, quo offendimur, dolor, doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. Ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. 38. Itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum, quod quibusdam medium videtur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse, verum etiam summam voluptatem. Quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est

aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore. Omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit. 39. At etiam Athenis, ut a patre audiebam facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, statua est in Ceramico Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogatiuncula delectatum: "Numquidnam manus tua sic affecta, quem ad modum affecta nunc est, desiderat?"—Nihil sane.—"At, si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret."—Ita credo.—"Non est igitur voluptas bonum." Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. Conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. Nam si ea sola voluptas esset, quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitate afflueret et illaberetur, nec manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. Sin autem summa voluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolere, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est, nihil desiderare manum, cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. Idcirco enim non desideraret, quia, quod dolore caret, id in voluptate est.

XII. 40. Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec impendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? Inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur. 41. Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur,

quid est, quod huc possit, quo melius sit accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec exspectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? Quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore; cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. Nec enim habet nostra mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere. 42. Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. Quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum (quod Graeci τέλος nominant), quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

XIII. Id qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore nominis capti, quid natura postulet, non intellegunt, errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, liberabuntur. Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabilis aut expetendas arbitraretur? Ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis, sed bonae valetudinis causa probamus, et gubernatoris ars, quia bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur, si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur, quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et comparandae voluptatis. 43. (Quam autem ego dicam voluptatem, iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea.) Nam cum ignoratione rerum bonarum et malarum maxime hominum vita vexetur, ob eumque

errorem et voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur et durissimis animi doloribus torqueantur, sapientia est adhibenda, quae et terroribus cupiditatibusque detractis et omnium falsarum opinionum temeritate derepta certissimam se nobis ducem praebeat ad voluptatem. Sapientia enim est una, quae maestitiam pellat ex animis, quae nos exhorrescere metu non sinat; qua praeceptrice in tranquillitate vivi potest omnium cupiditatum ardore restincto. Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles, quae non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt, totam etiam labefactant saepe rem publicam. 44. Ex cupiditatibus odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella nascuntur, nec eae se foris solum iactant nec tantum in alios caeco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant, ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiens solum amputata circumcisaque inanitate omni et errore naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere. 45. Quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa, qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posuit earum cupiditatum, quae essent et naturales et necessariae, alterum, quae naturales essent nec tamen necessariae, tertium, quae nec naturales nec necessariae. 46. Quarum ea ratio est, ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propterea quod ipsa natura divitias, quibus contenta sit, et parabiles et terminatas habet; inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest.

XIV. Quodsi vitam omnem perturbari videmus errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam, quae nos a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat iniurias et omnis monstret vias, quae ad quietem et tranquillitatem ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam propter voluptates expetendam et insipientiam propter molestias esse fugiendam?

47. Eademque ratione ne temperantiam quidem propter se expetendam esse dicemus, sed quia pacem animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet ac leniat. Temperantia est enim, quae, in rebus aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur, monet. Nec enim satis est iudicare, quid faciendum non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo, quod sit iudicatum. Plerique autem, quod tenere atque servare id, quod ipsi statuerunt, non possunt, victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt se libidinibus constringendos nec, quid eventurum sit, provident ob eamque causam propter voluptatem et parvam et non necessariam, et quae vel aliter pararetur, et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore, tum in morbos gravis, tum in damna, tum in dedecora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque poenis obligantur. 48. Qui autem ita frui volunt voluptatibus, ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et qui suum iudicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. Iidem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur, ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. Ex quo intelligitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, non quia voluptates fugiat, sed quia maiores consequatur.

XV. 49. Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. Nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitas nec vigiliae nec ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, molestia liberemus. Ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo imbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, multi amicos, non nulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni

est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contempsit, qua qui affecti sunt, in eadem causa sunt, qua ante quam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. Quibus rebus intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem.

XVI. 50. Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum: sed similia fere dici possunt. Ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper impertit aliquid cum sua vi atque natura, quod tranquillet animos, tum spe nihil earum rerum defuturum, quas natura non depravata desideret. Et quem ad modum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic improbitas si cuius in mente consedit, hoc ipso, quod adest, turbulenta est; si vero molita quippiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, numquam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. Plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur, dein sermo atque fama, tum accusator, tum index; multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicaverunt. 51. Quodsi qui satis sibi contra hominum conscientiam saepti esse et muniti videntur, deorum tamen horrent easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi "noctesque diesque" exeduntur, a dis immortalibus supplicii causa importari putant. Quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas, cum conscientia factorum, tum poena legum odioque civium! Et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris

neque imperii nec libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe parta minuit et potius inflammat, ut coërcendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur. 52. Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem. Neque homini infanti aut impotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile efficere possit, quod conetur, nec obtinere, si effecerit, et opes vel fortunae vel ingenii liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, benivolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem, praesertim cum omnino nulla sit causa peccandi. 53. Quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria, quae autem inanes sunt, iis parendum non est. Nihil enim desiderabile concupiscunt, plusque in ipsa iniuria detrimenti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti, quae pariuntur iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel plurimum afferat. Nam diligi et carum esse iucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatum pleniorem efficit. Itaque non ob ea solum incommoda, quae eveniunt improbis, fugiendam improbitatem putamus, sed multo etiam magis, quod, cuius in animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare, numquam acquiescere. 54. Quodsi ne ipsarum quidem virtutum laus, in qua maxime ceterorum philosophorum exsultat oratio, reperire exitum potest, nisi derigatur ad voluptatem, voluptas autem est sola, quae nos vocet ad se et alliciat suapte natura, non potest esse dubium, quin id sit summum atque extremum bonorum omnium, beateque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere.

XVII. 55. Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta, explicabo brevi. Nullus in ipsis error est finibus bonorum et malorum, id est in voluptate aut in dolore, sed in iis rebus peccant, cum, e quibus haec efficiantur, ignorant. Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis

voluptatibus et doloribus; itaque concedo, quod modo dicebas, cadere causa, si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos; quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, eorum tamen utrumque et ortum esse e corpore et ad corpus referri, nec ob eam causam non multo maiores esse et voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis. Nam corpore nihil nisi praesens et quod adest sentire possumus, animo autem et praeterita et futura. Ut enim aeque doleamus animo, cum corpore dolemus, fieri tamen permagna accessio potest, si aliquod aeternum et infinitum impendere malum nobis opinemur. Quod idem licet transferre in voluptatem, ut ea maior sit, si nihil tale metuamus. 56. Iam illud quidem perspicuum est, animi maximam aut voluptatem aut molestiam plus aut ad beatam aut ad miseram vitam afferre momenti quam eorum utrumvis, si aeque diu sit in corpore. Non placet autem detracta voluptate aegritudinem statim consequi, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit; at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus, etiamsi voluptas ea, quae sensum moveat, nulla successerit; eoque intellegi potest, quanta voluptas sit non dolere. 57. Sed ut iis bonis erigimur, quae exspectamus, sic laetamur iis, quae recordamur. Stulti autem malorum memoria torquentur, sapientes bona praeterita grata recordatione renovata delectant. Est autem situm in nobis, ut et adversa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ac suaviter meminerimus. Sed cum ea, quae praeterierunt, acri animo et attento intuemur, tum fit, ut aegritudo sequatur, si illa mala sint, laetitia, si bona.

XVIII. O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et derectam viam! Cum enim certe nihil homini possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis voluptatibus, videtisne, quam nihil praetermittatur, quod vitam

adiuvet, quo facilius id, quod propositum est, summum bonum consequamur? Clamat Epicurus, is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, non posse iucunde vivi, nisi sapienter honeste iusteque vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste, nisi iucunde. 58. Neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest nec in discordia dominorum domus; quo minus animus a se ipse dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. Atqui pugnantibus et contrariis studiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest. 59. Quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! Animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates immensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. Accedunt aegritudines, molestiae, maerores, qui exedunt animos conficiuntque curis hominum non intellegentium nihil dolendum esse animo, quod sit a dolore corporis praesenti futurove seiunctum. Nec vero quisquam stultus non horum morborum aliquo laborat; nemo igitur stultus non miser. 60. Accedit etiam mors, quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper impendet, tum superstitio, qua qui est imbutus, quietus esse numquam potest. Praeterea bona praeterita non meminerunt, praesentibus non fruuntur, futura modo exspectant, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu maximeque cruciantur, cum sero sentiunt frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperiis aut opibus aut gloriae. Nullas enim consequuntur voluptates, quarum potiendi spe inflammati multos labores magnosque susceperant. 61. Ecce autem alii minuti et angusti aut omnia semper desperantes aut malevoli, invidi, difficiles, lucifugi, maledici, morosi, alii autem etiam amatoriis levitatibus dediti, alii petulantes, alii audaces, protervi, iidem intemperantes et ignavi, numquam in sententia permanentes, quas ob causas

in eorum vita nulla est intercapedo molestiae. Igitur neque stultorum quisquam beatus neque sapientium non beatus. Multoque hoc melius nos veriusque quam Stoici. Illi enim negant esse bonum quicquam nisi nescio quam illam umbram, quod appellant honestum non tam solido quam splendido nomine; virtutem autem nixam hoc honesto nullam requirere voluptatem atque ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam.

XIX. 62. Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis. Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducitur: finitas habet cupiditates, neglegit mortem, de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit, non dubitat, si ita melius sit, migrare de vita. His rebus instructus semper est in voluptate. Neque enim tempus est ullum, quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. Nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat, quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed exspectat illa, fruitur praesentibus ab iisque vitiis, quae paulo ante collegi, abest plurimum et, cum stultorum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afficitur voluptate; dolores autem si qui incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent, ut non plus habeat sapiens, quod gaudeat, quam quod angatur. 63. Optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti, maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari, neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum vim. In physicis plurimum posuit. Ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici; omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum,

e qua ipsa horribiles exsistunt saepe formidines; denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus, quid natura desideret. Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum derigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. 64. Nisi autem rerum natura perspecta erit, nullo modo poterimus sensuum iudicia defendere. Quicquid porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi. Quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ii remotis sensibus ne id ipsum quidem expedire possunt, quod disserunt. Praeterea sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum. Sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitur contra mortis timorem et constantia contra metum religionis et sedatio animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata et moderatio natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis, et, ut modo docui, cognitionis regula et iudicio ab eodem illo constituto veri a falso distinctio traditur.

XX. 65. Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius de amicitia, quam, si voluptas summum sit bonum, affirmatis nullam omnino fore. De qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. Nec vero hoc oratione solum, sed multo magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. Quod quam magnum sit, fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis ab ultima antiquitate repetitis tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! Quod fit etiam nunc

ab Epicureis. Sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non necesse est. 66. Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. Alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. Ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. Nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 67. Atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi; quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. Quodquia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia cum voluptate conectitur. Nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 68. Quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. Quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. Praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: "Eadem," inquit "sententia confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum." 69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur, ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem

expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. Etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra exercendi aut venandi consuetudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit et iustius? 70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, ut ne minus amicos quam se ipsos diligant. Quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe evenire videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri.

XXI. 71. Quapropter si ea, quae dixi, sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt, si omnia dixi hausta e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur magistra ac duce natura nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus, qui hac exaudita quasi voce naturae sic eam firme graviterque comprehenderit, ut omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est, quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit, nisi quae beatae vitae disciplinam iuvaret. 72. An ille tempus aut in poëtis evolvendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio, aut se, ut Plato, in musicis, geometria, numeris, astris contereret, quae

et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt et, si essent vera, nihil afferrent, quo iucundius, id est quo melius viveremus, eas ergo artes persequeretur, vivendi artem tantam tamque operosam et perinde fructuosam relinqueret? Non ergo Epicurus ineruditus, sed ii indocti, qui, quae pueros non didicisse turpe est, ea putant usque ad senectutem esse discenda. Quae cum dixisset, Explicavi, inquit, sententiam meam, et eo quidem consilio, tuum iudicium ut cognoscerem, quae mihi facultas, ut id meo arbitratu facerem, ante hoc tempus numquam est data.

NOTES.

N.B.—G. refers te Smith's *Student's Latin Grammar* (Murray, 6s.).

§ 1. **Brute**: Marcus Junius Brutus (by adoption, Q. Servilius Caepio) was born B.C. 85. He made Marcus Porcius Cato his great political model. In 49 he followed Cato, took the side of Pompey, and opposed Caesar; but in 48 he was reconciled to Caesar, and became one of his adherents. In this year Cicero made him one of the speakers in his treatise *Brutus, sive de Claris Oratoribus;* and in 46 he dedicated to him his *Orator*, and later this treatise, *De Finibus;* and, two years later, the *Tusculan Disputations* and *De Natura Deorum*. In B.C. 44 Brutus joined Cassius and the other conspirators in the murder of Caesar. At last in B.C. 42 he was defeated at Philippi, and, to avoid being taken prisoner, threw himself on to his own sword. Caesar remarked of him: "Quicquid volt, valde volt."

summis ingeniis, exquisitaque doctrina: ablatives of quality, qualifying *philosophi*.

tractavissent: subjunct. by assimilation, to *mandaremus*, on which it depends; *mandaremus* is itself subjunctive, because it is subordinate to an indirect statement. See G. § 467.

varias reprehensiones: the four kinds are enumerated below. The study of philosophy may be objected to: (1) altogether (§ 2): (2) when treated seriously (§§ 2, 3); (3) in Latin (§§ 4-10); (4) as unworthy of Cicero (§§ 11, 12).

philosophari: the inf. here appears in its true character of a verbal substantive; it is in apposition to *hoc*, and the ordinary infin. —*e.g.* (1) *debeo dicere*, "I ought to speak," (2) *scis loqui*, "you know how to speak," can be explained as a verbal substantive, thus: (1) I owe speaking, and (2) you understand speaking.

id: *i.e. philosophari.*

non arbitrantur: think . . . should not be placed. Cf. *nego* = to say that . . . not.

personae: is literally a mask through which the voice of the actor sounded (*per sonare*); hence it came to mean a part or character (as here), and eventually a person.

dignitatis: this work was published in B.C. 45, by which time Cicero had held most of the highest offices of State (see Introd. § 1). The time at which the discussion is supposed to take place at Cicero's

villa in Cumae, as described in this book, is B.C. 50. *Personae* and *dignitatis* are the possessive genitives used predicatively, often called predicative genitives. See G. § 265.

§ 2. **eo libro** : a book called *Hortensius* (c. B.C. 46), of which only fragments remain. In it Cicero defended philosophy against the attacks of Hortensius.

Hortensio : Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, the celebrated orator, the contemporary and rival of Cicero in the law courts. He was born B.C. 114, consul B.C. 69, and died B.C. 50. Throughout his life he was a follower of Sulla and the aristocratic party. Until B.C. 70, when Cicero defeated him in the prosecution of Verres, he was the undisputed leader of the courts.

tibi probatus : *tibi* = Brutus. For the dative of the agent after a passive participle, see G. § 293.

plura suscepi : *e.g.* the *Academics*.

retinere : Cicero is afraid lest he should appear to be able only to arouse a temporary enthusiasm for philosophy, instead of maintaining a permanent interest in it.

semel : *semel* = once for all ; *olim* = once, formerly (*or* at some future time).

in reque : *in re* is regarded as one word ; so the *que* is attached to *re*, and not to *in*. Other examples in §§ 20, 23.

eo meliore : *eo* of course does not agree with *meliore*, but is the neut. abl. of excess after the comparative *meliore*.

§ 3. **perveniri** : "To come" naturally has no passive, but in Latin intransitive verbs are used impersonally, and only impersonally, in the passive.

† **fruenda** : verbs which govern any case but the acc. cannot as a rule be used in the passive, unless under some circumstances impersonally. The gerundive (to *be* enjoyed) is here used by analogy with *paranda*. The oblique cases of this gerundive from intransitive words are, however, occasionally met with : the nom. case is so rare that some editions read † *sed fruend*um *etiam sapientia est*.

etenim : here used to introduce a corroboration ; sometimes also it introduces a parenthesis or gives a reason.

Terentianus Chremes : 'the *Chremes* of Terence' (P. Terentius Afer), the celebrated Roman comic poet, born B.C. 185, died B.C. 159. Six of his comedies are left to us. He was a protégé and friend of Scipio Minor and Laelius. The character *Chremes* comes in the "Hautontimorumenos," and he warns his aged neighbour Menedemus not to weary himself by excessive work in the fields. Menedemus is so working because he cannot bear to live in comfort while his son is away, and possibly suffering hardship.

curiosi : lit. = full of care (*cura*), anxiety, trouble ; hence in good sense (1) careful, diligent : (2) in neutral sense, curious inquisitive ; and (3) in bad sense, meddlesome (πολυπράγμων), the meaning here.

II. § 4. **admirer** : the distinction generally drawn between *admiror* and *miror* is that *admiror* = to be pleased at something on account

of its extraordinary greatness, sublimity, or perfection ; and *miror* = to be surprised at, to regard something as new, singular, unusual. This distinction does not hold universally, as *admiror* here is used in the usual sense of *miror*.

idem : *īdem*, m. pl. (not *ĭdem*, neut. sing.), refers to *eos*.

ad verbum : lit. "to a word" (cf. *ad unum* = to a man); hence = word for word.

nomini Romano : lit. "the Roman name," *i.e.* everything that is called Roman.

Ennii : Q. Ennius, the Roman poet, born at Rudiae in Calabria, B.C. 239, died B.C. 169. He was a close friend of Scipio Africanus Major. He wrote in hexameters eighteen books of Annals of Roman History, and also many tragedies from Greek models, and comedies and *saturae*. Virgil constantly echoes him.

Pacuvii : M. Pacuvius, nephew to Ennius, and the most "learned" of Roman tragic poets, was born at Brundusium B.C. 220, and died B.C. 132. He wrote twelve tragedies and one *praetexta*. Of the former the two most renowned were the "Dulorestes" and "Antiopa," taken from Greek writers ; but they contained much original and independent work, and were not mere translations. The "Antiopa" has for its subject the strife of Antiopa's twin sons Zethus and Amphion.

Euripidis : Euripides, the "most tragic" of the poets of Greece, was born B.C. 480, and died B.C. 406. Among his tragedies he wrote about Antiope, and also about Medea (the daughter of Aëtes, king of Colchis), who took vengeance on her faithless husband Jason by killing his and her own two children, and also by murdering his new wife. The "Antiopa" is lost ; the "Medea" survives, with eighteen others.

† **Latinas litteras oderit** : this is an obvious interpolation inserted as a paraphrase of *inimicus paene nomini Romano*. If the words are kept, we must supply an *et*,—*quod dicat*, etc. . . . *et quod oderit*.

Synephebos Caecilii : Caecilius Statius (B.C. 219-166 ?), a Roman comic poet, by birth an Insubrian Gaul, was brought as a slave to Rome. His many plays, among them the "Synephebi" (the fellow-youths), were for the most part imitations of Menander. "Vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte," was, according to Horace, a stock criticism.

inquit : says *he*, *i.e.* an opponent of mine.

Andriam Terentii : for P. Terentius Afer, see *supra*, § 3. The "Andria" (*i.e.* the maiden from the island of Andros, one of the Cyclades) was the earliest of Terence's plays—produced B.C. 166.

Menandri : Menander of Athens was the most distinguished poet of the New Comedy ; he was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 291. He wrote over a hundred plays, of which only small fragments remain ; but we can obtain a fair idea of what they were like by the imitations of Terence and Caecilius.

§ 5. **tantum** : not "only," but "so much," "so greatly"=*tantopere*.

Sophocles : Sophocles, the celebrated tragic poet of Greece, was

born B.C. 495, and died B.C. 406. He is said to have written 117 plays, but only seven remain. Under him tragedy reached its highest perfection.

vel: here strongly recalls its kinship with *volo*—"you may call it the best if you *like*."

Electram: the play of "Electra" describes how Electra, the daughter of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, saved the life of her young brother Orestes, and then incited him to avenge the death of his father Agamemnon, who had been murdered by Clytemnestra, his wife.

tamen: this word is generally placed second in the sentence; but when special stress is laid on it, it may come first.

Atilii: M. Atilius, one of the early Roman poets, wrote tragedies and comedies, but chiefly the latter. Cicero calls him *poeta durissimus*, and Licinus describes him as *ferreus scriptor*—both allude to the harshness and inflexibility of his style.

Licinus: it is not known who is meant by this *Licinus*, or *Licinius* as some editions read.

† **Verum opinor**: there is another reading, which makes from *ferreum* to *tamen* a quotation from Licinius—

. . . . ferreum.
Scriptorem, verum opinor scriptorem tamen,

"an iron-like writer; yet, methinks, a true one, and so he must be read."

segnitiae, fastidii: predicative genitives=is a mark of . . . . See G. § 265, and *supra*, § 1.

Utinam ne in nemore . . .: the opening words of Ennius' "Medea," which is a translation of the "Medea" of Euripides. The first line in the Greek is—

εἴθ' ὤφελ' Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος.

§ 6. **tuemur ea**: *tueor* is said to be stronger than *tenere*, and weaker than *defendere*.

ne ipsos quidem est cur: there is *no* reason why they should read so many, even of those very Greeks. Instead of *nam si dicent*, etc., we should have expected *Nam si nostra non legent* (*quod ab illis haec tractata sint*) *ne ipsos*, etc.

Chrysippo: Chrysippus, a Stoic philosopher of Soli in Cilicia, B.C. 280-206, composed about 700 treatises. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά.

Diogenes (c. B.C. 239-151): a Stoic of Babylon, pupil of Chrysippus, and successor of Zeno of Tarsus at Athens. He was sent as ambassador, together with the Academic Carneades and Peripatetic Critolaus, from Athens to Rome in B.C. 155. His works are completely lost. The more famous Diogenes the "Cynic," of Sinope, lived earlier.

Antipatrum: Antipater of Tarsus, a pupil and successor of Diogenes (fl. B.C. 144).

Mnesarchum : Mnesarchus, a pupil of Panaetius, taught at Athens, B.C. 110.

Panaetium : Panaetius of Rhodes, B.C. 180-112, a pupil of Diogenes and Antipater, was an intimate friend of Laelius and Scipio Minor. His chief work, περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, in three books, was the basis of Cicero's treatise *De Officiis*.

multos alios : notice the non-insertion of *et* before *multos alios*. See G. § 561.

Posidonium : Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, a pupil of Panaetius at Athens, taught at Rhodes, where Cicero attended his lectures. Cicero subsequently carried on a correspondence with him, and therefore calls him "my friend," *noster familiaris*.

Theophrastus : of Eresus in Lesbos, a pupil of Plato, and afterwards a pupil and friend of Aristotle, became the head of the Peripatetics in B.C. 322. His best-known work is his ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες.

locos : the m. pl. form *loci* is regularly used in the sense of "topics," "general arguments" (locus = τόπος : hence τοπικός) ; the neut. pl. form *loca* = connected places, a region. See G. § 54, and cf. *jocus*, pl. *joci* and *joca* ; also *frenum* and *rastrum*, which make both *freni*, *rastri*, and *frena*, *rastra*.

compositis : abl. abs., another *rebus* being understood in addition to the *de iisdem rebus* ; their writings having been composed about the same subjects, but with a different method.

III. § 7. **male, credo, mererer** : this is, of course, ironical. *Mererer* is the apodosis of *si verterem*, but another conditional sentence is added, *si transferrem*. It is possible to regard the meaning as a combination of the two ideas, *si verterem . . . transferrem*, etc. Similarly two causal sentences introduced by *cum* are attached sometimes to the same principal verb.

Afranius : Lucius Afranius (fl. B.C. 94), an imitator of Menander, and writer of *comoediae togatae*, or comedies founded on Greek models but representing Roman life and manners, and played in Roman costumes.

Homero : Ennius traced his soul back to Homer by metempsychosis, and was hailed by the critics as "alter Homerus."

Menandro : see *supra*, § 4.

Lucilius : C. Lucilius wrote thirty books in various metres on politics, manners, and letters, and was regarded as the founder of Roman satire, which was subsequently developed by Horace and Juvenal. Born in B.C. 148, he served under Scipio Africanus in the Numantine War, 133, and died in B.C. 103.

Persius : C. Persius, a contemporary of Lucilius, was a very learned man. Report said that Lucilius did not wish ordinary uneducated people to read his works, as they would not understand them, nor the highly educated either, as they would criticise them. Cicero, unlike Lucilius, would like everybody, including the learned Persius, to read his writings. *Utinam esset ille Persius* = would that the famous Persius were one of my readers.

Scipio: P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, born B.C. 185, fought at Pydna under his father Aemilius Paullus. He devoted himself to literature, and numbered among his most intimate friends the Greeks Polybius and Panaetius, and the Roman poets Lucilius and Terence. He finished the Third Carthaginian War, and took Carthage in B.C. 146; and finished the Numantine War by capturing Numantia in Spain, in B.C. 133. His friendship with C. Laelius, a man of similar tastes to himself, was proverbial. Cicero gave the name *Laelius* as an alternative title to his treatise *De Amicitia*, and in B.C. 61 wanted to play Laelius to Pompey's Scipio.

Rutilius: P. Rutilius Rufus, consul B.C. 105. He was accused of extortion in the province of Asia during his proconsulship, and was unjustly condemned, probably for party reasons. Cicero visited him when in exile at Smyrna, where he gave himself up to study and philosophy, and became a disciple of Panaetius.

quorum: *i.e.* Persius, Scipio, Rutilius, and men like them.

ille: *i.e.* Lucilius.

Tarentinis: inhabitants of Tarentum, a Greek city in Calabria.

Consentinis = inhabitants of Consentia, the capital of the Bruttii, on the Crathis.

alia: this is the neut. pl., governed by *dicit* understood. Many MSS. read *alias*, which some grammarians say is used by Cicero only to express time = at other times, and not to express place = in other places, the sense which would be required here; hence *alia* is the preferable reading.

§ **libro . . . misisti**: Brutus had dedicated (*misisti*) a book on virtue to Cicero. *Mittere librum ad aliquem* = to *dedicate* a book.

usu venire: *usu venire* is an impersonal verb = to happen: lit. = to come in an opportunity, or occasion.

scripta de: "*translated* from." *Scribo* is here used in a special sense.

Scaevola: Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, see Appendix.

Albucius: Titus Albucius through his studies had become almost a Greek, and a thorough follower of Epicurus. He was propraetor of Sardinia in B.C. 103, and after his term of office was accused of extortion by C. Julius Strabo, and condemned, and went into exile at Athens. In B.C. 121 Scaevola, who was praetor, met him at Athens, and chaffed him about his Greek habits.

§ 9. **quem locum**: there is no verb in the text to govern *locum*, but it is easily understood, *e.g.* *tractavit* or *scripsit*. Similarly *dicit* is understood after Scaevola.

sale: *sal* m., lit. = salt; hence it is often used for the sea, and metaphorically it = (1) wit, shrewdness, and in Nepos (2) good taste, elegance, from the idea of the flavouring qualities of salt.

quam Romanum: the *quam* depends on *maluisti*.

municipem Ponti: Pontius and Tritannius were fellow townsmen of Albucius; the former was noted for his bodily strength.

primorum: the gen. pl. of *primores*, and not of *primus*.

signiferumque: gen. pl.

accedis saluto ... omnis cohorsque : notice that in *accedis* and *omnis* the final *s* is so slightly pronounced as to be practically omitted for the purposes of scansion. These lines, little as they look it, are hexameters; *maluisti* is a trisyllable, the *u* being regarded as a consonantal *v*. The scansion of

id quod | malui sti te | cum ad me ac|cedis' sal | uto

is very harsh; but this harshness is not surprising in a poet so ancient as Lucilius. The contraction of *mihi* to *mi*. and its elision before the A of *Albucius*, and the quadrisyllable *inimicus* at the end of a hexameter, are also harsh.

χαῖρε : the Greek word for the Latin *salve*.

§ 10. **Mucius** : *i.e.* Scaevola.

† **satis** : this word *satis* has been supplied by conjecture, as it is necessary for the sense, though wanting in the MSS. Perhaps a better reading is *non mirari non queo*, the first *non* having been omitted in copying, because of the *non* which follows before *queo*. Cf. note on *non inopem*, infra. There is a conjecture *rimari* = to examine, find out, instead of *mirari*. With this reading there is no need for the insertion of either *non* or *satis*.

domesticarum : belonging to one's house, home, country, or nation.

† **non inopem** : the *non* is here required by the sense, though omitted in the MSS. So frequent is this omission that a pupil is sometimes told that *non modo* must often be translated as *non modo non*. It is not at all certain that Cicero is justified in his boast that Latin has as full, expressive, and fertile a vocabulary as Greek.

quando : *quando* (not *quum*) must be always used for the direct interrogative *when?*

vel dicam : or shall I rather say. This phrase corrects, qualifies, or amplifies a previous expression; *nobis* of course = Cicero.

IV **forensibus operis** : seems to cover Cicero's work, both as a politician and a pleader. Elsewhere he distinguishes between work done as *orator* and *in foro*—the latter place being now mostly used for purposes of law and finance.

IV. **praesidium** : my post. This refers to a saying of Pythagoras, that a man must not desert his post unless ordered to do so by his general, *i.e.* God.

in eo . . . ut = to the end that, with a view to; lit. = in the object that.

ne simulent : this depends on the *modo* before *legant*, provided they read those Greek authors, and do not merely pretend to read them.

velint . . . desiderent : the subjunctives expressing a class after *iis qui*.

§ 11. **nemini** : in Cicero the dative of the agent (instead of *ab* with the abl.) is, for the most part, only used after the past participle passive: see G. § 293, and note on *tibi probatus* above in § 2. As regards the number of his works, Cicero at that time was certainly

out-stripped by Varro, the antiquarian (B.C. 116-28); but Cicero had written more speeches and rhetorical treatises than Varro.

fortasse: *fortasse* takes the indic., but *forsitan*, in Cicero, takes only the subj. In poetry and post-Augustan prose *forsitan* is found also with the indic.

si vita suppetet: Cicero lived but little more than two years after the *De Finibus* was published; but during this period his literary activity was enormous.

quam cum . . . tum: *cum . . . tum* = "not only, . . . but also," "both . . . and"—a very common construction.

finis: *finis*, *extremum*, *ultimum*, etc., are all slightly varying phrases for the same general idea = object, end.

alienum ejus dignitatis: *alienus*, in the sense of *foreign to*, is followed by either (1) gen., (2) dat., (3) abl., or (4) *a* with abl.

† tribuat: notice the subj., expressing an indefinite class. † There is another reading, *tribuit*, which states as a matter of fact the position which each man assigns to Cicero.

§ 12. **partus ancillae**: a very old question among ancient jurists was: "To whom does a slave's child belong; to the master, or to the father?" According to Brutus it belonged to the father.

P. Scaevola: the pontiff. See Appendix.

Manilius: Manius Manilius Nepos was a renowned jurist, consul B.C. 149, conducted an attack against Carthage, and burnt the Carthaginian fleet in sight of the city. Some authorities say that M'. (= Manius) is a mistake for M. (= Marcus).

M. Brutus: M. Junius Brutus, tribune of the plebs, B.C. 83, father of the Brutus who killed Caesar. He was a skilled jurist.

et legimus: there is nothing in the text to show whether this is the present *lĕgimus* or the perfect *lēgimus*; it can be either.

ut sint: for the "concessive" *ut* = supposing that, see G. § 432.

vendibiliora: *vendibilis* (from *vendo*, I sell) = (1) saleable; hence (2) popular, agreeable, acceptable.

his litteris: *i.e.* *hoc libro* or *his libris*, in this treatise. *Littera* in sing. = a letter of the alphabet; in pl. *litterae* = a collection of letters, epistle, book. See G. § 51.

nobis: this is probably not the dative of the agent. See note § 11 *nemini*; but the indirect object of *probaretur* = what is made acceptable, demonstrated, to us. *Diceretur* is followed by *a* with the abl.

V. § 13. **veniat in medium**: come into the middle (of our view), come before us.

Epicuri: see Appendix and Introduction.

convincere = (1) to conquer, (2) to convict of crime or error, to *refute*, (3) to prove incontestably, demonstrate.

L. Torquato: for Torquatus and Triarius, see Appendix.

§ 14. **in Cumanum**: to my villa or estate at Cumae. The noun understood is *praedium*. It was the custom for rich Romans to have several country estates not far from the capital. Cicero, through his

success in the law courts, and through the number of legacies bequeathed to him, had acquired considerable wealth, some of which he expended on his country estates. At one time or another he had eight such villas, besides places at which he could stay the night in travelling between them (*deversoria*). His *Tusculanum* (estate at Tusculum) was his favourite.

pauca primo : another instance of the ellipse of a verb (*e.g. dicta sunt*) which can be readily supplied from the context. This ellipse of the verb of saying is so common that it does not require, except for a special reason, to be again commented upon.

de litteris : *litterae*, besides meaning a letter, see note on § 12, very often, as here, means "literature," "literary matters," *e.g.* in § 1.

non tu quidem oderis : *quidem* is said to qualify the word it follows, but this is not always true. *Quidem* is very commonly placed after a pronoun, and yet qualifies the verb, as here.

quae pertinerent : the imperf. subj. depends on the past *tradidisse*, although this infin. is governed by a present tense. The subjunct. is used to express "things which *in Epicurus' opinion* belonged to."

ab eo delectari : the prep. *ab* brings out the personal idea of Epicurus ; *eo* by itself would have expressed an instrument, *i.e.* his philosophical system.

Aristoteli : observe this form of the genitive (like *Archimedi, Achilli, Pericli*). *Aristotelis* is the more usual genitive.

ornamenta : Plato, Aristotle (in his lost *Dialogues*), and Theophrastus all wrote in well-chosen and well-arranged language, and their works were embellished with various adornments of speech and style ; but Epicurus paid no attention to such things.

illud adduci : the *illud* here is an accus. of respect, and is used adverbially : "I can scarcely be induced as to the following." *Adduci* is followed by either of three constructions—(1) *ut* with the subjunct., (2) the infin., or (3) *ad* with the gerund.

§ 15. **vult . . . intellegam** : notice the difference between (1) the indic. *vult*, and (2) the subjunct. *intellegam* : (1) his meaning, what he, as a matter of fact, wishes to say ; and (2) so that I may understand it, what I may understand.

a philosopho non asperner : 'I would not turn away in disgust from a philosopher, if he brings eloquence,' etc. *Aspernari* = *ab se spernere* = to cast off a thing or person : hence to disdain = *recuso*, with the accessory idea of aversion. *Contemnere*, "to scorn," is the opposite of *metuere*, "to fear ;" and *despicere*, "not to value a thing," is the opposite of *revereri*. *Aspernari*, meaning "*to disdain*," governs an accus. ; but when it has the derived meaning "to turn away with disdain" it is followed by *a* and the abl. It is, however, possible to supply the accus. *eloquentiam* after *asperner*, *a philosopho* being used instead of *philosopho*, the dative of the indirect object, because the following *flagitem* = demand from, can be naturally used with *a*.

quot homines : "There are as many opinions as there are men," is a quotation from Terence's *Phormio*, III. 3, 14 (l. 454) ; the line being—

Quot homines tot sententiae : suus cuique mos.

"Every man to his liking," and "doeth that which is right in his own eyes," are amongst our corresponding phrases.

tandem : *tandem* in the sense of "pray" is very commonly and idiomatically used by Cicero in interrogative clauses.

noris = *noveris* ; the perf. subjunct. governed by *modo* = *dummodo*, provided only you know (*i.e.* *have become* acquainted with).

§ 16. **Phaedrum . . . Zenonem** : for Phaedrus and Zeno, see Appendix.

frequenter audivi : Cicero and Atticus attended together the lectures of Zeno and Phaedrus at Athens in B.C. 79. *Frequenter* seldom means "frequently" in Cicero, as here ; "in large numbers" is its usual meaning.

cotidie : the difference between *cotidie* and *in dies* is that *in dies* = increasing or diminishing day by day ; while *cotidie* (= daily) contains no such notion of change.

VI. § 17. **principio** : in the first place, in *natural philosophy* ; the second place, *i.e.* the other part of philosophy (both *logic* and *ethics*), is dealt with in § 22.

primum : there is no *deinde* or correlative word to correspond with this.

alienus : he is quite a foreigner ; *i.e.* either (1) is "not original," but adopts that of Democritus ; (2) he is quite "off the point," estranged from the truth, *alienus a veritate* ; (3) "unversed." "Outsider" is the most comprehensive equivalent, but is not quite a philosophical term.

Democritea : the doctrines of Democritus.

atomos : from *α-* not, and *τέμνω*, to cut = what cannot be cut, indivisible : hence the smallest part of a body that is capable of separate existence, hence an atom. It corresponds closely to the Latin *individua*. Remember that *atomus, -i*, is fem., it being short for *ἡ ἄτομος οὐσία*, "indivisible substance."

soliditatem : the thickness and solidity of the particles prevents them from being divided.

in infinito inani : notice the use of the adj. *inani* as a noun.

ita ferri : the construction is *censet corpora ita ferri*, etc.

§ 18. **non fere labitur** : *fere* and its cognate *ferme* (which is said to be a superlative form of *fere*) = (1) nearly, almost, about : (2) quite, just : (3) (with negatives) = scarcely, hardly : and (4) (of time) = generally, commonly. The meaning required here is either (3) or (4), generally does not go wrong, *or* scarcely goes wrong.

quae materia sit : the material cause. According to Aristotle and his successors, there were four causes : (1) *Material*, (2) *Efficient*, (3) *Formal*, and (4) *Final*. The Efficient cause is that which acts ; the Material cause is that which is acted upon ; as when fire melts wax, fire is the efficient cause, and wax the material cause of the melting. The Formal cause is the essence of an object, the qualities which determine it to be that which it is ; and the Final cause is that for the sake of which any effect takes place. The efficient is a

higher and more important cause to discover than the material, yet both Democritus and Epicurus have neglected the former. The Academics and Peripatetics, on the other hand, distinguish between the Material and Efficient causes.

illae Epicuri propriae ruinae : *illae* = the following. *ruinae* = the errors and faults which cause the destruction of Epicurus' fabric of philosophy.

deorsum : or *deorsus*, from *de* and *vorsum* or *vorsus* = turned down, = downwards, down. The use of this word seems rather strange, when we are told just before (§ 17) that "there is no highest and no lowest," *nec summum nec infimum*.

deinde ibidem : there is no *primum* expressed to correspond to the *deinde*, but it is understood after *censet*. *ibidem*, lit. "in the same place" = in his course of argument.

occurreret : this metaphorical use of *occurro* = to occur, to come into one's mind, is very common.

e regione : there are two important meanings of this adverbial phrase: (1) "in a straight line," "directly" (the meaning here); and (2) "in the opposite direction," over against, opposite. *Ad lineam* is a synonym for, and explanatory of, *e regione*.

† **itaque attulit rem commenticiam** : these words are probably an interpolation from the marginal note of some reader.

declinare, etc. : Cicero's objection seems very reasonable. If all the atoms are borne downwards by their own weight in a straight line, and no assertion is made that any of the atoms are larger or move more quickly than the others, it necessarily follows that no atom will overtake or combine with another. To get out of this difficulty, Epicurus alters his original theory that all the atoms move down in a straight line, and asserts that, for some unexplained reason, a certain number diverge and move horizontally or slantingly, and thus meet other atoms that are moving in vertical and slanting directions.

ex quo efficeretur : the infin. *effici* could have been employed, but the subjunctive (which expresses a purpose or result) is used here because an *effici* precedes.

quo . . . quam fieri, etc. : *quam fieri*, etc., explains the *quo*. We have here the two constructions after a comparative : (1) the abl., and (2) *quam*, with an appropriate case. *Physico* is the dat.

§ 20. **si omnes atomi declinabunt** : Cicero is not altogether fair in his argument. Epicurus is not bound to say that all the atoms move slantingly, and even if they did, there is no reason why they should move in parallel directions, so that a certain number would inevitably meet.

sive : or if, *not* whether.

suo nutu : *nutus* = (1) a nodding or nod, and hence (2) = will; and *suo nutu* here = of its own will or accord, without any external force. *Nutus* is also said to mean (3) a downward tendency or force, gravity—a sense possible in this passage, but not so probable as (2).

provincias ; *provincia*, lit. (1) "a province," *i.e.* a territory out of

Italy acquired by the Romans, and brought under Roman government: hence (2) official duty, administration. The meaning here = to give to the atoms the duty, as it were, of governing and deciding, etc. The modern phrase, "sphere of influence," has a similar pair of meanings.

haeret: is at a loss, is completely wrong: lit. sticks fast as in a quagmire.

physici: the predicative gen. (a subdivision of the possessive gen., see G. § 265), "like a natural philosopher." The verb *est* is here omitted.

credere aliquid esse minimum: to believe that there is such a thing as a minimum. As a matter of fact, philosophers, even if they do not believe it, often assume that there is a minimum, chiefly for the sake of convenience. Thus we define a molecule as the *smallest* collection of atoms which is capable of separate and independent existence: and an atom is the *smallest* particle of matter.

Polyaeno: Polyaenus, of Lampsacus, a mathematician of high repute, and friend of Epicurus, adopted the latter's philosophical system, and maintained that geometry was worthless.

homini erudito: Cicero often alludes to, and admires the learning of, Democritus, and makes insinuations against Epicurus' ignorance, or want of learning.

geometrica: instead of this word, the neut. pl. of the adj. used as a subst., some editions read *geometriam*, but the variation is unimportant.

pedalis: a foot in diameter. Cicero's authority for this is a letter from Epicurus to Pythocles, in which the former states that τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται—κατὰ δὲ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸ ἤτοι μεῖζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ ἔλαττον μικρῷ ἢ τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκον ὁρᾶται.

paulo: *paulo*, like *eo* and *quo*, when used with comparatives, is the abl. of excess or measure (see G. § 321), and is allied to the abl. of instrument.

§ 21. **quae εἴδωλα nominant**: Epicurus held that every body gave off from its surface certain small particles, each particle representing the original body in miniature. These particles struck against the eye of a person, and rushing thence with great speed to the soul or brain, produced the idea of the body or object in the mind. In this book Cicero uses several Greek terms, *e.g.* εἴδωλα, ἀπειρία, λογική, τέλος; but as a rule he avoids them, and invents appropriate Latin equivalents.

oriantur: the subjunctives *oriantur* and *intereant*, and also the previous *videamus* and *cogitemus*, are used to express a kind of indirect speech, the thought and opinion of another, to which the writer does not bind himself.

cotidie: see note, § 16.

VII. § 22. **in altera philosophiae parte**: the first part (*principio*) is begun at § 17 and continued, down to § 21.

inermis : from *in* and *arma*, without arms ; hence defenceless.

nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet : in addition to his neglect of definition—which secures *distinctness* of thought and expression—he omits to expound classification and division, whose business is to make thought and language *clear*.

quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio : how reasoning is to be effected and conclusions obtained, with special reference to the Syllogism and Deductive reasoning generally.

captiosa . . . ambigua : no theory of Fallacies, like Aristotle's Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι.

§ 23. **confirmat** : there is probably an ellipse here of some part which has been lost. At any rate Cicero appears to dismiss in one paragraph (§ 22) a subject much larger than the first, which occupied five paragraphs (§§ 17–21).

ad haec . . . refert omnia : according to Epicurus, pleasure was the standard by which to measure conduct. Other such standards have been virtue—"the happiness of the greatest number"—self-realization.

Aristippi : the possessive gen., not the predicative gen.

a Cyrenaicisque : notice the peculiar position of *que*. We might have expected *defenditurque a Cyrenaicis*. Cf. § 2.

neque eum Torquatum : there is no second *neque* to correspond with the *neque* here, but we have in its place the graphic *Quid?* at beginning of § 24. T. Manlius Torquatus, son of L. Manlius Capitolinus, in the war of B.C. 361, slew in single combat a gigantic Gaul who had challenged any Roman to fight him. From the dead body Manlius took the *torques*, or chain, and placed it round his own neck, and was on that account called *Torquatus*. He was dictator in 353 and 349, and consul in 347, 344, and 340. In 340 his colleague was P. Decius Mus, who, by his self-sacrifice, gained a great victory over the Latins. Previous to the battle, the consuls had ordered that no Roman should engage in single combat with a Latin, on pain of death ; but young Manlius, stung by the insults of a Tuscan noble, accepted his challenge, and slew him. The father, instead of being proud of his son's prowess, ordered him to be executed for the breach of military discipline.

cognomen : a Roman's *nomen* was the name of his *gens* ; in addition to this, he had a *praenomen*, *e.g.* Publius, Quintus, and generally a *cognomen* (the name of his family, which was a division of the *gens*), *e.g.* Torquatus, Strabo, Scipio. Some Romans also had an *agnomen*, or extra name, *e.g.* Manlianus, Africanus, Asiaticus. See G. § 933.

tertio consulatu : B.C. 340. See *supra*.

apud Veserim : Veseris, a river in Campania.

securi : this refers to the *secures* or axes of the lictors who were ordered by the consul to execute young Manlius. Distinguish *sĕcuris*, an axe, from *sēcuris*, the dat. or abl. pl. of *securus* = free from care.

§ 24. **Quid?** see *supra*, corresponds to *neque* in *neque eum Torquatum*.

Torquatus: Titus Manlius Torquatus was consul B.C. 165 with Cneius Octavius. He was as austere as his ancestor mentioned above, and showed his severity in a similar fashion. His son, Decimus Junius Silanus Manlianus, was accused of robbery and oppression during his praetorship in B.C. 142, by the inhabitants of Macedonia, his province. Torquatus, at his own request was entrusted, with the investigation of the charges, and having found his son guilty, banished him from his presence. The son thereupon hanged himself through grief, and the unrelenting father would not even attend his funeral.

consul: in B.C. 165.

Cn. Octavio: Cneius Octavius assisted Aemilius Paullus in conquering Perseus, 167, and obtained the honour of a naval triumph in that year. He was consul in 165 with Torquatus, and in 162 was sent with two colleagues on an embassy to Syria, but was assassinated in the gymnasium at Laodicea by a Syrian Greek named Leptines.

emancipaverat: it was not an uncommon event for a person to be adopted into another family. When this happened, the person took the name of his new family and added the name of his former family, the latter word being made to end in *anus*. Thus Manlius Torquatus, when adopted by Decimus Junius Silanus, became Decimus Junius Silanus *Manlianus*; the son of Aemilius Paullus, when adopted by Publius Cornelius Scipio, became Publius Cornelius Scipio *Aemilianus*, see G. § 933. As long as the father lived a Roman son was in his power (*in potestate*, *in manu patris*), unless he was emancipated. The strict meaning of *emancipo* (*e manu capio*) was to declare a son free from the *patria potestas* by the thrice-repeated act of *mancipatio* and *manumissio*.

Macedonum: Macedones, inhabitants of Macedonia, a district in the north-east of Greece.

legatis accusantibus: the legates in this case complained to the senate, who either investigated the matter themselves or referred it to any judge they might select. By the *Lex Calpurnia*, in B.C. 149, a *quaestio perpetua de pecuniis repetundis* was instituted for the purpose of adjudicating upon cases of this kind.

pecunias cepisse: had taken money, *i.e.* had been bribed.

causam dicere: the regular phrase for "to defend one's self."

ut omittam pericula . . . veniamus: notice the change from the sing. *omittam* to the pl. *veniamus*. Cicero alone is making the former remarks: his two friends are to join him in the later discussion.

§ 25. **huic Triario**: it will be remembered that Cicero, Torquatus, and Triarius are carrying on this discussion in Cicero's villa at Cumae.

historiae: the sing. *historia* could have been used here, but the pl. is found, perhaps because attracted by *litterae*, or else because the various parts or books of a history are each regarded as a history.

evolutio: this word is a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*, *i.e.* is used once here, and nowhere else; but cf. *in portis evolvendis* in § 72. The ancient books were written on rolls of papyrus or parchment, which it was necessary to unroll for the purpose of reading.

voluptatis: partitive genitive depending on *quid*.

nec dixeris: 'don't say:' for this form of the imperative see G. § 420. Also compare *Democritum nollem vituperatum* in § 21 = I won't have Democritus slandered. See G. § 446.

haec . . . illa: *haec* this nearer to me = the latter, *illa* = that farther off, yonder = the former.

voluptati: the predicative dative; the latter are to me *for* a pleasure. the dative together with the verb forming the predicate. This dative is classed in the Grammar under the heading Dative of Purpose or Result, see G. § 297.

† **neque Metrodorus**: this is a happy emendation for *neque vero tu*, the reading of the MSS. Metrodorus of Lampsacus. B.C. 324–277. was the most distinguished of the disciples of Epicurus. whom he would have succeeded as the head of the Epicurean School had he not died before his master. His philosophy was more sensual than that of Epicurus. † There is another reading. *neque vestri*.

saperet . . . didicisset: subjunctive after hypothetical *qui*, or *qui* introducing a class. See G. § 475.

quod quaeritur saepe: as to the question that is often put. why, etc., this sentence is a noun-sentence in apposition with *cur*, etc.

laetitiam id est voluptatem: Cicero is extremely clever in finding Latin equivalents for Greek words, but he often experiences some difficulty. Here *laetitia* is too weak, and *voluptas* too strong for *ἡδονή*.

referatur: we should have expected the imperf. *referretur* after *concederetur;* the present is irregular, but is to be explained as being used (1) for the sake of vividness, or (2) to express a possible condition, or (3) as outside the main conditional sentence in the same way as *quod minime ille vult* is outside it.

§ 26. **doctrinis**: Epicurus is constantly reproached by Cicero for the deficiency in his literary education and studies. Epicurus, on the other hand, was convinced that education was not necessary or desirable except in so far as it taught how to live happily. See *infra*, § 71.

vellem fuisset: this construction after *volo*, *nolo*, and *malo* (the *ut* being understood) is very common. See G. § 447.

quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur: "The possessors of which are called learned." This is good idiomatic Latin, though in English we could not have two relatives at the beginning of a sentence. Cf. *qua qui utuntur* in § 52, *qua qui est imbutus* in § 60, and *quos qui tollunt* in § 64.

VIII. **quoquo**: from *quisquis*, whoever. Distinguish *quisquam*, any (used in negative and comparative sentences, and in interrogative sentences expecting the answer no); *quivis*, *quilibet*, any one you please; and *quisque* = each.

intellegere quid diceret: the subjunct. here is the ordinary subjunct. in an indirect question. See G. § 433.

aliena: the doctrines of another man. Cf. § 17. note.

si qua : although *quis* has *quae* for its fem. sing. and neut. pl., *si quis* = any, has *si qua*, see G. § 83 ; but the form *quae* is also used.

† § 27. **iracundiae** : a better reading is *iracundae*, an adjective agreeing with *contentiones*. If *iracundiae* is kept we have a violation of the rule that where a series of nouns are joined together in English by *and*, in Latin either all or none of them must be connected by *et* or *que*. Here we should have expected *contentionesque*. See G. § 561.

Triari : the voc. sing. of masc. nouns in *-ius* has for its termination *-i*, see G. § 19, *Obs.* 4. So also *filius* and *genius*.

§ 28. **habeo quae velim** : *sc. respondere* or *dicere* = I have some answer that I should like to make, if you have no objection.

An me, inquam : the ellipse before *an* (if there be an ellipse) is something like "Of course I have no objection, or do you think," etc.

percurri : *percurrere* = to run cursorily through the whole (of the Epicurean doctrines).

de una voluptate : *i.e. de voluptate sola.*

inquit : *inquam* and *inquit* are used only with *Or. Rect.*, and never with *Or. Obl.*

de physicis alias : the adv. *alias* in Cicero is always used of time = at other times, or at another time. But in post-Augustan Latin it is also used of place and manner = elsewhere, otherwise. See note on *alia* in § 7. Torquatus does not mention logic (§ 22) ; but it was of such slight importance for Epicurus that he omits it.

§ 29. **modo sis ista aequitate** : abl. of quality ; provided you are a man of such impartiality as you display.

IX. **quid et quale sit** : the nature and character. Abstract nouns in English must often be translated by a sentence in Latin introduced by a relative, *e.g.* "provided they attain some cherished object" = "dum *quod velint* consequantur."

non quo arbitrer : not because I think. *Quo*, meaning "for the reason that," is always preceded by *non*, and governs the subjunctive.

ratione et via : a common phrase for "systematically," "methodically."

nusquam : this word can either = *ad nullam rem*, be referred to nothing, corresponding to the previous *ad id*, or we may suppose *esse* or *inveniri* to be understood = but it itself exists nowhere, no example of it is found anywhere, the ideal does not exist, but is the object of our aspirations.

§ 30. **eaque gaudere** : *ea* is abl. = rejoices in it.

negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione : the *neque* repeats the negative of *negat*, he says that there is need of neither reasoning *nor* arguing. If we use the word *deny* in English, it must be followed here by 'either . . . or.'

calere ignem, nivem esse albam : these phrases are accusatives and infinitives used as subjects to the verb *sentiri*.

† **oportere** : all the MSS. read *oporteret* ; the subjunctive would be irregular, especially as the infin. *admonere* follows. It is possible, however, by omitting the semicolon after *dulce*, and joining *quorum*

closely with the preceding sentence, to regard *quorum oporteret* as a dependent relative sentence in *oratio obliqua*, and the verb therefore rightly in the subjunctive. The imperf. *oporteret* after the present *putat* is explained by regarding the latter as an historic tense.

confirmare : after *oportere* the common personal subject of the following infin. is very often omitted.

tantum : this word goes with *admonere* = it is sufficient only to mention.

interesse : the various meanings of this word should be remembered, viz.: (1) to lie between; (2) to be apart, different (as here): (3) to be present at, take part in; (4) impersonally, to be of interest, importance.

altera occulta : *altera* is the abl. of instrument, and refers to *argumentum et conclusio rationis*, and agrees with the latter noun *conclusio*. *Occulta* is neut. acc. pl., subject of *aperiri*.

reliqui : partitive gen. depending on *nihil*.

ad naturam : the more usual phrase is *secundum naturam* = in accordance with nature.

ea quid percipit : "what does she take," the literal meaning of *percipio*, or "what does she decide upon as that by means of which she is either to seek or avoid anything, unless it be pleasure and pain?"

§ 31. **sunt quidam . . . qui velint** : the subjunct. is used because reference is made to an indefinite class.

sed animo etiam . . . posse : we must understand *dicant* before *posse* from the previous *negent*.

X. § 32. **illo inventore veritatis** : the reference is of course to Epicurus.

quasi architecto : notice the *quasi*, which is employed in order to prepare the way for a metaphorical or rare use of a word, or for a Latinised Greek word.

explicabo : the forms of this verb in *-avi*, *-atum*, and *-are* are the older, those in *-ui* and *-itum* are found in Virgil and Livy. Cicero mostly uses the form in *-ātum*.

quia voluptas sit : notice the subjunct.; see G. § 421, also § 487 and § 488.

ratione : in a reasonable way.

amet, consectetur, adipisci velit : these three subjunctives, which are united by a conjunction in English, have according to the rule either none expressed in Latin (as here), or else one is attached to each word after the first. We could have had here *amet* vel *consectetur*, vel *adipisci velit*. For the subjunct. cf. § 31 *ad init*.

ut . . . quaerat : *quaerat* is subjunct. after *ut* expressing a result. See G. § 449.

quis nostrum : *nostrum* is the partitive gen.; *nostri*, the ordinary gen., is probably the neut. gen. of the adj. *noster*, and = "of our nature," "of our condition."

nisi ut aliquid : after *ne*, *nisi*, *num*, and *si*, *quis* is used instead of

aliquis for "any;" see G. § 83. Here *aliquid* is emphasized and made definite, and so the form *aliquid* is used instead of *quid*.

§ 33. **praesentium voluptatum**: for the formation of the gen. pl. in *-um* and *-ium* of the 3rd decl., see G. §§ 36–38.

excepturi sint: subjunct. because it is an indirect question depending on *non provident*. See G. § 433.

id est: is used to explain an unknown or new phrase; here the *mollitia animi* is substituted for the first time in place of *laborum et dolorum fuga*.

soluta nobis est eligendi optio: the gerund *eligendi* is almost redundant, the *optio* by itself expressing "free choice." The emphasis is still further marked by the addition of *soluta*. One of the leading tenets of the Epicureans was the universality of free-will—in opposition to the Stoic belief in *ἑιμαρμένη*.

nihil impedit quominus: for the construction of negative verbs of hindering, see G. § 463, also § 461.

hic . . . dilectus: *hic* is probably an adv. here, but it can also be taken as a pronominal adj. *Dilectus* = choice, theory of choice.

§ 34. **paulo ante**: in §§ 23, 24.

memoriter: with good memory, not = by heart.

quaeso: this is the old form of *quaero* (the perf. is the same for both verbs). It can be followed by (1) *ut*, (2) the simple subjunct., or (3) it can be used absolutely.

sicine: from *sice*, the old form of *sic* = so, thus: and the interrog. particle *ne* = so. This word always begins a sentence, and almost always implies reproach.

crudelis = *crudeles*. For the common variations in Latin orthography, see G. § 39.

nihil ut cogitarent: the *ut* here is called consecutive—depends upon the *sicine* and *tam crudelis*.

turbent: this intransitive use of the verb *turbo* is for the most part confined to poetry.

§ 35. **mox videro**: the fut. perf. is idiomatic = I shall soon have seen, you may rest assured I shall soon see.

torquem detraxit hosti: these sentences are the remarks of alternate speakers, *e.g.* Cicero and Torquatus, the opponent and supporter of Epicurus respectively. The *quidem* has in each case a disparaging effect. The *torques* was probably a twisted necklace, but some authorities try to show that it was a portion of the defensive armour.

multavit: *multo* = to punish: from *multa*, a fine, penalty. Originally *multa* only applied to a fine of cattle, for cattle was the only property they possessed: later on it was applied to a pecuniary fine. *Poena*, on the other hand, meant any punishment, *e.g.* corporal or capital punishment, or imprisonment.

importuno: *importunus*, from *in* and *portus* = without a harbour: hence of a place that is without a harbour = savage: hence of a person = savage, churlish, cruel. From the primary meaning comes also that of unsuitable, inconvenient, unfit. The opposite of *importunus* is *opportunus*.

sanciret : *sancio* = to render sacred or inviolable (the meaning here) ; hence it came to mean (1) to ratify ; (2) to devote, dedicate to some one ; and (3) to forbid under pain of punishment. The *sanction* of law has two meanings in English: (1) permission given by the law : and (2) the penalty by which a law is enforced.

§ 36. **haec ratio late patet** : this method of reasoning has a wide application.

eo dilectu constituto ut : "when such a plan of choice has been established that," etc.

XI. § 37. **erit enim jam** : *jam* = already, soon ; approximates in meaning closely to *mox*.

propius disserendi locus : *infra*, chap. xiii.

voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit : cf. § 29. "quid et quale sit id, de quo quaerimus."

continens : temperate, moderate, self-restrained.

liberatione : *liberatio*, like many other abstracts in *-io*, has both an active and a passive meaning, *i.e.* = (1) a releasing, setting free ; and (2) the meaning here, a becoming free, being set free. See also § 40, *allevatio*.

§ 38. **quiddam** : *quoddam* is the neut. adj., and *quiddam* is the pronominal substantive from *quidam*.

omni dolore careret : *careo* and *egeo* mostly govern the abl. ; *indigeo* generally takes the gen. ; *careo* always takes the abl. in Cicero, and is found with the gen. only in ante-classical poets. *Egeo* is very rarely, if at all, found with the gen. in Cicero ; but Plautus, Horace, Caesar and Tacitus use the gen. frequently.

quisquis : see note on *quoquo*, § 26.

† **omnis autem privatione doloris** : the MSS. read *omni*, and regard *privatione doloris* as one compound word. But against this reading, which seems both natural and intelligible, some authorities urge that Cicero wished to express not complete freedom from pain, but freedom from all kind of pain, and have accordingly changed the *omni* into *omnis*.

terminari : = limited, fixed, defined.

augeri : this is an instance of asyndeton ; in English we should use some adversative conjunction, *e.g. but*. *Augeo* = to increase, make larger (trans.) ; and *cresco* = to increase, grow larger (intrans.).

§ 39. **a patre** : the more usual preposition would be *e* instead of *a*. The father was L. Manlius Torquatus, consul with Cotta in B.C. 65. Catiline conspired with Paetus and Sulla, who after election to the consulship had lost their office through corrupt practices, in order to kill Torquatus and Cotta ; but the conspiracy was unsuccessful. After his consulship Torquatus obtained the province of Macedonia ; in consequence of his exploits in his province, on the motion of Cicero, the senate conferred on him the title of *imperator*. In B.C. 63 he helped to subdue Catiline's conspiracy, and in 58 he opposed the banishment of Cicero.

Ceramico: Ceramicus is the name of two places, one within, and one without Athens, in the latter of which were the monuments and statues of heroes who had fallen in war.

Chrysippi: see § 6.

rogatiuncula: a little question, a diminutive of *rogatio*. Cf. *homunculus* (also *homuncio* and *homullus*) and *homo*. Holstein says it was a conclusion or rather syllogism, the argumentative form of question, into which the Stoics put their proofs.

Cyrenaicos: see Appendix.

nihil ad Epicurum: *sc. pertinet* or *attinet*. For Epicurus see Appendix.

quasi titillaret: as it were, tickled, γαργαλίζω. Notice the necessity of a *quasi* being inserted. Cf. § 32.

nec manus . . . posset: this is the beginning of the apodosis.

ulla pars: *sc. corporis.*

primum: the first answer, viz., that the hand was in want of nothing.

secundum: that the hand would desire pleasure, if pleasure was a good.

XII. § 40. **extremum**: the neut. nom. The distinction between *summum, extremum, ultimum, bonum* is not very great: the same thing is looked at from different points of view. See § 11.

constituamus: subjunct. used imperatively; in § 41 we have the imperat. *statue*. A conditional sentence beginning with *si* could have been substituted in either case.

animo et corpore: not the objects of *fruentem*, but = in mind and body.

et firmitatem: instead of a second *et*, we have *ad ea cum accedit*: in § 40 *ad init.*

dolor in longinquitate levis: the grief which lasts over a long while is usually mild.

celeritas: swiftness in passing away.

§ 41. **accedit**: *accedere* = to approach, must be often translated by "to be added to." So *pereo* must often be translated "to be killed" = pass. of *perdo*. Cf. ἀποθνήσκειν and ἀπόλλυμι.

ut neque divinum numen horreat: one of the advantages of believing in the Epicurean theory was that a man had no need to fear the gods; for they, according to Epicurus, did not trouble themselves about men's affairs. "Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira," says Lucretius. The *ut* is a consecutive or explanatory *ut* after *accedit*. So *accidit ut* = it happens that. *Est ut viro vir latius ordinet arbusta* = "One man may plant his shrubs wider apart than another." See G. §§ 449, 450.

quanti maximi . . . possunt: for the constr., cf. *De Amic.*, XX. § 74. *Tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima esse potest, morum studiorumque distantia.*

fore: this fut. infin. is governed by the noun *spe*, in the same way as a fut. infin. regularly follows the verb *spero*.

referta : from *refercio*, not from *refero*, the pass. part. of which is *relata*. See G. § 147.

nec . . . quicquam : *sc. aliud* or *praeterea.* Torquatus does not want to say that the mind has no place where it can stop as a boundary, but that pleasure is the only boundary for the mind to stop at.

omnesque : this follows on after *nec enim habet*, so that the-*que* has the force of *but* in English.

sua natura : abl.

§ 42. **omnino** : "speaking generally," "in short."

aut . . . aut : these two conjunctions = either . . . or, are mutually exclusive. *e.g. aut Caesar aut nullus. Vel . . . vel* (connected with *volo*, I wish) = either you please. Cf. infra, *vel summum, vel ultimum, vel extremum bonorum, sive . . . seu* = whether . . . or. See Stud. G. § 570.

omnis . . . laudabilis : both accus. plur. See G. § 39, also § 887.

vivatur : as a rule an intransitive verb (*e.g. vivo*) cannot have a passive, but in Latin intransitive verbs are often used impersonally in the passive. Cf. *pugnatum est, itum* or *ventum erat.*

ad id autem : notice the demonstrative *id* takes the place of the relative *quod* : in English we should probably keep the relative, "which itself is referred to nothing else, but to which all things are referred." The change from the relative to the demonstrative is generally made when the two words (as *quod* and *id* here) are in different cases.

res referuntur omnes : Boeckel thinks that *res* is an interpolation caused by repeating the *re* of *referuntur.*

XIII. **istae vestrae virtutes** : *e.g. sapientia, temperantia, fortitudo*, and *justitia*. the division of the virtues adopted in Plato's *Republic*.

ut . . . probamus : *ut*. when it means as or when, governs the indic.; *ut* final or consequential governs the subjunct.

quia bene navigandi rationem habet : "because it comprises the method of navigating a ship well." The subj. of *habet* is probably *ars*, though it could possibly be *gubernator.*

sapientia. quae ars vivendi putanda est : we find this idea in many forms in Cicero. *e.g. ars est philosophia vitae, vivendi ars est prudentia.* So in Plato σοφία is a πρακτική ἀρετή. a virtue concerned with practical life.

§ 43. **ne invidia verbi** : the construction is elliptical : you now see what kind of pleasure I am talking of. and I mention this lest, etc., *i.e.* you must supply *et haec dico* from the *dicam.*

priventur : *sc. homines*, which is understood from *vita hominum.*

terroribus : *e.g.* the fear of the gods, and fear of death

cupiditatibus : the *cupiditates* are explained just below.

pellat : this may be regarded as subjunctive of (1) purpose, or (2) result, or (3) indefinite class. See G. § 482.

qua praeceptrice : abl. abs.

vivi : infin. passive used impersonally. Cf. § 42, note.

§ 44. **foris**: an abl. form, expresses both place where, and place whence: it means "out of doors," "without," and is the opposite of "*intus*." The acc. form, expressing motion, is *foras*. It is derived from the same root as *foris*, *-is*, fem., a door.

sapiens solum: we should have expected the adj. *solus* agreeing with *sapiens* rather than the adv. *solum*.

amputata: the word *amputo*, to cut round, lop off, comes from *am = ambi*, around, and *puto*, to cleanse, prune. The meaning *to think*, which is generally associated with *puto*, is derived from that of *to prune*, set in order, arrange; hence as applied to accounts or thoughts = to reckon, think.

inanitate: the Greek word in Epicurus is κενοδοξια, vanity, conceit.

§ 45. **partitio**: the division, as explained in the next sentence, is into three classes: (1) the desires which are both natural and necessary; (2) those which are natural though not necessary; and (3) those which are neither natural nor necessary.

quarum ea ratio est ut = and the account (relation) of them is such that, *i.e.* they are such that . . . . *Necessariae* seems to stand here for *naturales et necessariae*, *naturales* for *naturales nec tamen necessariae*, *inanes* for *nec naturales nec necessariae*.

opera multa: abl. of instrument. *Opera*, *-ae*, fem. = service, pains, and implies a free will and desire to serve; while *opus*, *-eris*, n., is generally used of mechanical work, as that of animals, slaves and soldiers. *Operae* in the pl. = labourers, workmen.

XIV. § 46. **vindicet**: *vindico* from *vim* and *dico* = to assert force or authority over: hence = to claim; hence, since, if you claim an object from another object, you set the first object free from the other object, *vindicare* came to mean "to free, set free, emancipate."

omnis: acc. pl. See G. § 39.

ferant: cf. the use of the English word *bear* in "bearings," "bear to your right," etc.

§ 47. **temperantiam**: the second of the four Cardinal Virtues, which are: (1) sapientia (§§ 43–46), (2) temperantia (§§ 47, 48), (3) fortitudo (§ 49), and (4) justitia (§§ 50–53), the Greek equivalents of which are, respectively, σοφία, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη.

placet: this word, the 3rd sing. pres. subjunct. of *plāco* 1, must be distinguished from *plăcet*, the 3rd sing. pres. indic. of *plăceo* 2.

non faciendumve: the two words *non facere* are regarded as one compound verb, say = *fugiendum*; so instead of *quid faciendum fugiendumve sit* we have here *quid faciendum non faciendumve sit*. Similarly we have *voluptatis non dolendive particeps*.

† **quod sit judicatum**: some editions read *est*, and say the subjunct. has crept in through confusion with the preceding *faciendumve sit*. The difference in meaning between the *sit* (expressing a certain amount of hesitation), and *est* (asserting a fact), is slight, and can be easily distinguished: "whatever" may be used in translating the former, and "what," if the indic. be used.

libidinibus constringendos : to be held in fetters by their lusts. For the use of the gerund and gerundive. see G. §§ 531–541.

tum . . . tum . . . tum : sometimes . . . sometimes . . . sometimes, or at one time . . . at another . . . at another.

§ 48. **quod sentiant** : which they happen to feel on each occasion as it happens.

perpetiuntur : suffer or endure through, *i.e.* from beginning to end.

nec intemperantiam . . . temperantiamque : in English we should join the negative to the verb, and have for the conjunctions both . . . and (*que* . . . *que*). After *nec* you would expect another *nec*, but the construction is changed from the negative into an affirmative.

non quia . . . fugiat, sed quia . . . consequatur : after *non quia* we should regularly have the subjunct.; but after *sed quia* we should expect the indic. See G. §§ 487, 488.

XV. § 49. **fortitudinis** : *fortitudo* (ἀνδρεία) is the third Cardinal Virtue. See § 47.

ratio : principle, method, reasoning, viz., that courage is not desirable for itself, but because of the pleasure that it brings.

† **assiduitas** : some MSS. read *assiduitates*, but this is probably a mistake caused by confusion with the pl. *vigiliae*.

perdiderunt : *per* in composition = through, thoroughly, *e.g. perpetior*, *perago* ; but it has also a bad sense of coming to an end, *e.g. perdo, pereo*. *Pereo* is the passive of *perdo*, in the same way as *veneo* (*venum eo*), to be sold, is the passive of *vendo* (*venum do*), to sell.

in eadem causa : in the same condition or position.

qua : we might expect *in qua*, but the repetition of the preposition is often dispensed with in cases of this kind.

mediocrium : *sc. dolorum*. Of moderate pains we are masters, *i.e.* we have control over moderate pains.

si minus : if not ; *minus* here differs little if at all from *non*. Sometimes *minus* before a verb or adj. is not as strong as *non*.

e vita : the Epicureans and Stoics looked on suicide with lenient or favourable eyes. Nowadays it is looked upon as a crime ; at Rome, during the early part of the Empire and the latter part of the Republic, it was regarded almost as a virtue. Plato allowed it in case of terrible calamity ; Aristotle regarded it as a desertion of the post allotted by the State.

theatro : this simile is supposed not to be original, but to have been quoted from Democritus. We are at once reminded of Shakespeare's "All the world's a stage."

suo nomine : lit. in their own name, *i.e.* on their own account.

XVI. § 50. **Justitia** : the fourth of the four Cardinal Virtues.

† **impertit** : has been conjectured in order to supply a verb which seems to have been omitted in the MSS. Madvig reads *affert*, which makes a similar meaning to *impertit*, and is equally good. Boeckel reads *sed contra semper facit fidem*, altering the *aliquid* of the MSS. into *facit fidem*, and quotes a similar passage from *De Officiis*, II.

ix. 34. "Harum igitur duarum ad *fidem faciendam* justitia pollet." The *aliquid* or *alit quid* of the MSS. might, according to him, easily have been a copyist's mistake for *acit id* = *facit fidem*.

cum sua vi : *cum* here is not a preposition but a conjunction, *cum . . . tum* being = not only . . . but also.

defuturum : the noun *spe*, like the verb *spero*, is often followed by the future infin. ; cp. § 41.

non depravata : not depraved by idle vain desires or appetites.

† **et quem admodum** : the *et* is deficient in the MSS., but might easily have dropped out in consequence of the copyist's mistake arising from the termination *et* of *desideret*.

turbulentaeque sunt : these two words are possibly an unnecessary interpolation.

sic improbitas si : the *improbitas si* is wanting in the MSS., but is an excellent conjecture by Madvig. Unless *improbitas* or some such word were supplied there would be no subject to *turbulenta est*. *Improbitas* is a better conjecture than *injustitia*, as Cicero makes *temeritas* not *imprudentia* the opposite of *prudentia*, and *libido* not *intemperantia* the opposite of *temperantia* ; so *improbitas* rather than *injustitia* would be the opposite of *justitia*.

hoc ipso quod adest : by the very fact of its presence.

turbulenta est : the MSS. read *et*.

molita : *i.e.* *mōlita* from *mōlior*, not *mŏlita* from *mŏlo*.

quamvis : *quamvis* in Cicero is either followed by the subjunct., or is used in connection with an adjective. In later writers and in the poets *quamvis* is used like *quamquam*, which takes the indic. or subjunct. according to the fundamental distinction between these two moods. See G. §§ 502, 503.

index : a proof, informer, witness. There is another reading *iudex* (*i.e.* *judex*), judge ; but *index* is the better. *Vindex*, the punisher or avenger, has also been suggested.

multi : *e.g.* Quintus Curius, who was an accomplice in Catiline's conspiracy ; he betrayed the secret to his mistress Fulvia, who in her turn communicated it to Cicero.

te consule : Cicero was consul in B.C. 63, in which year he successfully defeated the conspiracy of Catiline.

indicaverunt : some MSS. read *judicaverunt*, but the nonsense this reading makes is perhaps a proof that *index* is the preferable reading above. *Judex* and *judico* are much more common words than *index* and *indico*.

§ 51. **deorum tamen horrent** : *sc.* *conscientiam*. They are afraid of the consciousness of the gods ; they are afraid lest the gods should know.

"**noctesque diesque**" : this is a poetical quotation either from Ennius, and quoted by Cicero in *De Senect.*, I. i., or it is Cicero's translation of a verse from Aratus :

"Cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur."

The collocation *noctesque diesque* is not found in Cicero's prose, but

he would use any of the following expressions : *noctes diesque*, *noctes et dies*, *et dies et noctes*, *dies noctesque*.

cum conscientia : *conscientia* is the abl. of instrument; *cum . . . tum* conjunctions.

† **et potius inflammat** : the *et* has been inserted, and does not appear in some MSS. Some MSS. have *potius* alone, and some *potius atque ;* whence Holstein reads *potiusque*, and Teubner *et potius*. There is no need to change the *et* or *que* into *sed*, because, as we saw in § 41, note on *omnesque*, a *que* after a negative sentence has often to be translated by *but*, since the affirmation is opposed to or contrasted with the negative statement.

§ 52. **fidem** : for the asyndeton. in omitting *et*, see G. § 561.

infanti : *infans*, which is derived from *in* = not, and *for*, *fari*, to speak, is here used in its literal sense of not speaking, unable to speak, not eloquent. Similarly *impotenti* = without power or ability.

conducunt : *conduco* = (1) to bring together, collect ; (2) to hire, take on lease ; and (3) (neuter, used impersonally for the most part only in the present, sing. and pl.) to be of use to, to profit.

et opes : the *et* corresponds to the *neque* at the beginning of the sentence.

qua qui utuntur : for the two relatives at the beginning of the sentence, cf. note on § 26, *quas qui tenent*.

quiete : the adv. of *quietus ;* it could not here be the abl. of *quies* = with quietness, because in these kinds of adverbial phrases we must add either a preposition (*e.g. cum quiete*) or an adjective (*e.g. tanta quiete*).

§ 53. **detrimenti** : like *emolumenti* is a partitive genitive.

dixerit : notice the negative imperative *ne quis dixerit* = "let no one call." See G. § 420. The perf. subjunct. is mostly, but not solely, used with the 2nd pers., and the pres. subjunct. with the 3rd.

afferat : subjunct. because it is in a dependent sentence in a kind of *oratio obliqua*. A *sed quia*, introducing a true reason in direct statement, is generally followed by an indic. See G. §§ 487, 488.

cujus : the antecedent of *cujus* is *eum* in *eum respirare*.

§ 54. **exitum** : another synonym for the *summum bonum*, *ultimum bonum*, *extremum bonum*, or *finis*.

derigatur : for the spelling of this word, see note on § 57.

suapte : for the termination *-pte* added to the abl. of possessive adjectives in order to strengthen them, see G. § 79, *Obs.* 2.

XVII. § 55. **brevi** : an adv. = "briefly," "in a few words." This form is very frequently found in Cicero, instead of the fuller *breviter*.

in iis rebus, cum : = *in eo quod*, in the fact that.

cadere causa : "fall, or fail, in their case," "lose their case," *i.e.* are found to be wrong. *Causa* is here used in the technical sense of law-suit.

afferat : the subjunctive, expressing a possibility or probability rather than an assertion. *Quamquam* is usually followed by the indic. in Cicero. See G. § 503.

nec . . . non multo: the two negatives destroy one another. Sometimes, however, in Latin negatives placed like this strengthen one another.

praesens et quod adest: these two expressions are not pleonastic, but refer respectively to time and place: whereas *praeterita* and *futura* refer only to time.

† **doleamus (animo)**: *animo* is found in all the MSS., but is probably an interpolation of a copyist.

si aliquod: after *si* we should have expected *quid* instead of *aliquod*, but the latter word is used for emphasis, the meaning being *some* and not *any*.

impendere: remember the difference between *impendo, -di, -sum*, 3 (trans.), to weigh out, and the word in the text *impendeo*, 2 (intrans.), to hang over, impend, threaten.

§ 56. **momenti**: partitive gen. governed by *plus*.

utrumvis: refers to *voluptas* and *molestia*, both feminine words, and yet we have the neuter *utrumvis*. See G. § 224 (2), and the example from Livy there quoted, "*Ira et avaritia imperio potentiora erant*." Anger and greed were objects too powerful to be governed.

at contra gaudere: *contra* an adv. = "on the other hand." *Gaudere nosmet* is acc. and infin. governed by *placet* understood.

successerit: *succedo* does not necessarily imply an idea of good fortune, though it is occasionally used in the sense of to prosper, succeed. The word has the following meanings: (1) to go under, come under; (2) mount, ascend; (3) submit to; (4) to ascend; (5) *to follow after, take the place of*; and (6) to go on well, prosper.

quae sensum moveat: it will be remembered that there are two kinds of pleasures: (1) consciously active, and (2) inactive and restful.

§ 57. **sapientes**: acc. after *delectant*, whose nom. is *bona praeterita*: *grata* is abl.

est autem situm in nobis: "but there is a certain quality placed in us such that."

XVIII. **O praeclaram**: for the interjectional accusative, *e.g. me miserum! O fallacem hominum spem!* see G. § 250.

derectam: the verbs *derigo* and *dirigo* are said by some to be different spellings of the same verb: others, however, contend that the words are to be distinguished in the same way as *describo* and *discribo*. Roby regards them as the same word, and prefers the spelling *derigo* and *derectus* to *dirigo* and *directus* respectively.

videtisne: "do you see?" *i.e.* you surely (do) see.

id quod propositum est: is in apposition to and explained by *summum bonum*, the object of our search and discussion.

clamat: notice this emphatic word = loudly asserts, vehemently insists, instead of a mild word like *dicit*.

justeque: the addition of a *-que* to the last of a group, the members of which are not each joined by *-que* or *et*, is unusual; but see G. § 561.

nec sapienter, etc. : this is the Latin way of saying *jucunde vivere*, and *sapienter, honeste, juste vivere* are convertible terms.

§ 58. **quo minus animus . . . potest** : here *quominus* is not the ordinary conjunction which governs a subjunctive ; but = "et eo minus animus potest." "and on that account the mind is not able." *Minus* here varies little in meaning from *non ;* there is, however, some notion of comparison.

a se ipse dissidens secumque discordans : cf. *supra*, § 44, *inter se dissident atque discordant.*

liquidae voluptatis : *i.q. purae voluptatis.*

atqui : this word is derived from *at* = but, and *qui*, the old abl. of the indefinite *quis*, used adverbially ; thus it = "but anyhow," hence its ordinary meaning "but yet."

quieti : the partitive gen. of *quietum, -i*, fr. *quietus*, not the pred. dat. of *quies.*

† § 59. **inanes** : there is another reading instead of *inanes*, viz. *immanes.*

dominationis : the word *dominatio* always conveyed to the Republican Romans the odious and hateful meaning of overbearing, arrogant despotism.

hominum : to be taken closely with *animos ; conficiunt curis* is looked upon as a quasi-compound verb, exactly parallel with *exedunt.* Some editors say that *conficiunt curis* was interpolated by some copyist in order to amplify *exedunt*, and compare § 51, "eorum animi noctesque diesque exeduntur." The separation of *hominum* from *animos* does seem rather strained.

sit : subjunct., because an indefinite class is referred to.

stultus : this word is not found in the MSS., and perhaps it is not necessary to insert it in the text, since it can be readily supplied in order to understand the meaning.

§ 60. **Tantalo** : Tantalus, the son of Zeus, divulged the secrets entrusted to him by his father, and was punished in the lower world by suffering constantly from thirst. He was placed in the middle of a lake, the waters of which receded from his lips directly he attempted to drink. Over his head were branches of trees with fruit on, which fled in like manner directly he grasped at them. In addition to this there was a huge rock hanging over his head, which constantly threatened to fall and crush him. From his name we get the English word "tantalise," which = to keep on disappointing a person just when his hopes or wishes are on the point of being fulfilled.

superstitio : the literal meaning of this word, which is derived from *super*, over, and *statio*, standing, is "a standing still over a thing" in amazement or dread, especially at things divine or supernatural ; hence it came to mean superstition, excessive fear of the gods, as opposed to *religio*, which is the proper, respectful, or dutiful feeling of reverence for the gods. Epicurus and his followers always strongly opposed superstition, soothsaying, etc.

qua qui : for the two relatives, cf. § 52, and note on § 26, *supra.*

meminerunt : a perfect tense with a present meaning. Cf. *odi* and

novi, and see G. § 113. *Coepi* has only "perfect" forms, but has a past meaning = I began.

fruuntur : deponent verbs like *fruor*, *vescor*, *fungor*, etc., which govern the ablative can be readily explained by regarding them as middle or reflexive verbs followed by an ablative of the instrument : thus, I enjoy myself, feed myself, employ myself with, etc.

sero : distinguish this word *sēro* = late, too late, from *sĕro* (*serui*, *sertum*, 3), to twine, and *sĕro* (*seri*, *satum*, 3), to sow.

quarum potiendi spe : *quarum* and *potiendi* are both genitives depending on *spe*, *potiendi* being an explanatory genitive in apposition to *quarum*, "and by the hope of these things," *i.e.* "of possessing them." *Potior* generally governs the ablative, but not infrequently it governs the genitive, and it is just possible that *quarum* here is governed by *potiendi*, and *potiendi* by *spe*.

§ 61. minuti et angusti : with reference to mental qualities, petty and narrow-minded. Cf. Gr. μικρόψυχοι.

† **morosi** : this is a very good emendation for *monstrosi*, the reading of the MSS., which makes no sense. By adopting *morosi* we get three pairs of epithets : (1) *malevoli* and *invidi*, referring to envy ; (2) *difficiles* and *lucifugi*, referring to unsociability ; and (3) *maledici* and *morosi*, referring to ill-temper and censoriousness.

intercapedo : a rare word = *intermissio*, only used here in Cicero. It occurs also in the *Epistles ad Familiares*, XVI. 21, in a letter not written by Cicero himself.

igitur : *igitur* generally stands second word in the sentence—very rarely first. When it does stand first, as here, it is especially emphatic ; or else it is used in a philosophical conclusion, when there is no other emphatic word in the sentence.

multoque : abl. of measure or excess. See G. § 321.

nos : *sc. dicimus*, which governs *hoc*.

nescio quam : the *nescio* in *nescio quis* is regarded as a kind of indeclinable particle, and can be used after a verb in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd persons, without any change in the person, number, or tense of *nescio* ; thus they gave some sword to the general = *imperatori nescio quem gladium dederunt.*

quod appellant : *quod* refers to *umbram*, and strictly ought to be fem., but it is attracted to the neut. by the following *honestum*, which is predicative to it. This kind of attraction is perhaps the rule rather than the exception ; see G. § 229 *b*, *iustam gloriam qui est fructus verae virtutis honestissimus.*

virtutem autem : *sc. dicunt*, from the preceding *negant*, which = *dicunt . . . non . . .*

XIX. **§ 62. quadam ratione** : "in a certain way," in some degree, to a certain extent.

inducitur : is introduced, is brought on before our notice.

neglegit mortem : he neglects, *i.e.* pays no regard to, death. See *supra*, §§ 40 and 49.

metu : as is mentioned above, one of Epicurus' special objects in

his philosophy was to remove superstition and excessive fear of the gods. See *supra*. § 41. Epicurus held that the gods lived in blessed tranquillity, and did not trouble themselves about the affairs of men, who consequently had no need to fear the gods.

sit : conditional subjunct. following *migrare*.

de vita : *migro* is sometimes followed by *de*, and sometimes by *ex* or *e*.

instructus : *instruo* = (1) to pile up, erect ; (2) to set in array (of armies) : (3) to prepare, furnish. *Instructus* can very seldom be translated by *instructed*, and then only in connection with such words as *doctrina*, *studia*, *artes*, etc. Be careful not to translate such words as *officium*, *securus*, *obtineo*, by their English cognates, unless you obtain sufficient verification. Thus these words respectively mean "duty," "free from care," and "keep possession of."

grate : *grato animo* = with pleased and grateful mind, with pleasure.

praesentibus : this abl. after *potior* is said to be the abl. of comparison implied in the verb, the literal meaning of which is to be more able, to be better, master of ; hence *to possess*. See G. § 15, *Obs.* 1.

si qui incurrunt : the *qui* here stands for *aliqui*, since after *ne*, *nisi*, *num* and *si*, *quis* is used for *aliquis*.

plus habeat : "have more reason ;" *sc. causae*, partitive gen. depending on *plus ;* and take *quod* as a conjunction = that, approximating closely in use to *cur*. Another way of taking the passage is to regard *plus* as an ordinary accusative, and the *quod* before *gaudeat* and *angatur* as an accus. of respect and referring back to *plus*.

§ 63. **Epicurus** : *sc. fecit* or *dixit*.

exiguam dixit fortunam : the adjective *exiguam* is here to be taken as part of the predicate, and is almost equivalent to an adverb : "fortune intervenes to a slight extent," *i.e.* seldom.

percipiatur, . . . videamus : notice the present tenses, although in *Or. Obl.* governed by the past *dixit*. It is true that some MSS. give *dicit*, but all the better MSS. read *dixit*. These presents must either be regarded as an irregularity or else as historic tenses.

vestra : refers to the Stoics, whose doctrines Cicero expounds later on, and to the Academics, both of whom prided themselves on their dialectic. The Epicureans, on the other hand, regarded dialectic and logic as superfluous. See § 22.

nullam : this is followed by *nec* . . . *nec*, which emphasise and do not remove the negative idea.

vim : nearly all the early editions, and also Morelius and Holstein, read *vim*, but the two chief MSS. read *viam*. The emendation seems preferable, since, although we can say "dialectic shows the way to . . .," it is straining language to write "in the art of dialectic there is a way to a better life."

in physicis : see § 17, "in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur."

ea scientia : refers not to *in physicis*, but to *dilectica*, and = *in scientia hujus rei* (*i.e. dilecticae*). Boeckel, however, says *ea scientia* refers to *physica* or natural philosophy.

omnium autem rerum natura : by a knowledge of the nature of all things we obtain four things, viz., freedom from (1) superstition, (2) fear of death, (3) ignorance, and (4) we obtain a better moral character.

morati : *mōrātus*, an adj. derived from *mos* = "having certain manners," well-mannered, must be distinguished from *mŏrātus*, the participle of *mŏror*, I delay, and from *mōrātus*, the participle of *mōror*, I am foolish.

didicerimus : notice the fut. perf. tense after the future *erimus*, where in English we use the present or perfect.

servata illa . . . regula : this refers to the *κανών* of Epicurus. Cf. *De Nat. Deor.*, I. 43. Velleius says "ex illo coelesti Epicuri de regula et judicio volumine," "from that divine scroll of Epicurus on the canon of judgment, and judgment." *περὶ κριτηρίου ἢ κανών*.

omnium : it is very seldom that *omnium* = of all things; but the excuse for its employment here in the neuter with this meaning, is that we have a *rerum* following close after, and *omnium rerum*, the correct expression for "of all things," would have sounded tautologous.

§ 64. **qui si omnes veri erunt** : cf. *judicia rerum in sensibus*, etc., § 22.

quos qui tollunt : *quos* refers to *sensus*, but is an abbreviated expression for "the truth or reliability of sensation." Notice the two relatives at the beginning of the sentence. See §§ 26, 52, and 60. The people referred to as *qui tollunt sensus* are the defenders of the New Academy, who said we could never attain to truth, but only to probability, and that the senses and understanding were both liable to error.

ii : the MSS. read *hi*, which is justified by Boeckel because definite people, the Academics, are alluded to.

quod disserunt : *i.e.*, that only probability is attainable. It is obvious that if people cannot know anything, they cannot know that probability only is attainable; all they can say is that it is probable that probability only is attainable.

metum religionis : is here used very much in the sense of *superstitionis metum*. The word *religio* is either derived from *relĕgere*, to read or consider again; or more probably from *religare*, to bind again, and hence approximating in meaning to *obligatio*. It means (1) reverence for God, piety inward and outward (*i.e.* manifested by ceremonies and rites); (2) religious scruples, religious awe; (3) a religious offence; (4) holiness, sanctity; (5) a sacred place. For the difference between *superstitio* and *religio*, see note, § 69.

rerum occultarum : things hidden and mysterious in the earth, air and heaven. The genitive depends on *ignoratione*.

natura : abl. abs. with *explicata* understood. In the abl. abs. construction, when the nouns are joined together by *-que* or *et*, the participle may be put in the plural, although some or all of the nouns are in the singular.

regula : abl. of means.

† **ab eodem illa** : *eodem* = Epicurus, who has been just mentioned

together with his canon (*κανών*. *regula*). *Illo* may be used, as in "Alexander ille," in the sense of famous. The MSS. read *ab eadem illa*, which must refer either to *regula* or to *e physicis; ab eodem illo* is preferable.

XX. § 65. **locus** : a topic. Cf. § 9. *quem quidem locum*.

nullam omnino fore : Cf. *De Amic.*, IX. 32. *Omnino*, in the sense of "at all" after a negative, is very common.

nihil esse majus : the whole of this chapter should be compared with Cicero's *De Amicitia*, which as the name implies deals with the subject of friendship, and expresses Cicero's own views. In this book we have only the Epicurean view.

fictae veterum fabulae : Cicero makes a contrast between true history and *fictae fabulae*, where scope was given to ancient writers to invent instances of friendship.

tria vix amicorum paria : the three pairs are Theseus and Pirithoüs, Achilles and Patroclus, Pylades and Orestes ; thus in going from Theseus to Orestes, you go from the beginning to the end. In the *De Amic.*, IV. 15, he talks of *vix tria aut quatuor paria*, the fourth pair being Damon and Phintias. In real history Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Q. Fabius Maximus and P. Decius Mus (the second), Scipio and Laelius, etc.

paria : *par* an adj. = equal : *par* (m.), subst. = comrade, companion ; and *par* (n.), subst. = a pair.

Orestem : Orestes, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, slew his mother because she had murdered her husband, his father. In order to be purified from this murder he had to bring the statue of Artemis to Greece from the Tauric Chersonese. In this expedition he was accompanied by his friend Pylades.

Theseo : Theseus, the great legendary hero of Attica, supposed to have been king in the 13th century B.C., and to have united the demes of Attica into one political whole, the chief city being Athens. Pirithoüs helped him to carry off the famous Helen, and in return Theseus joined him in his attempt to carry off Proserpine from the lower regions.

una in domo : Epicurus bequeathed his house and gardens to his pupils, as a permanent place for studying his philosophy. This house was in danger of being pulled down and the gardens built upon in the time of Cicero ; but the danger was averted through the mediation and liberality of the Epicurean teachers Phaedrus and Patro. The Epicureans are often referred to as the philosophers of the Garden (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων), in the same way as the Stoics are the philosophers of the Porch (στοά).

conspiratione : *conspiratio* = "a breathing together ;" hence (1) harmony, concord : and in a bad sense, (2) plotting, conspiracy.

greges : this word is sometimes used in an invidious sense, as a flock or crowd of ruffians (*desperatorum hominum flagitiosi greges*), who, like sheep, blindly follow their leader in his crimes ; but often, as here, it is used in a good sense = a crowd, band. Cf. *philoso-*

piorum greges and *stipati gregibus amicorum*; and Horace describes himself as "Epicuri de grege porcum."

§ 66. **tribus**: distinguish *tribus*, the dat. or abl. of *tres* = three, from *tribus*, *-us*, fem., a tribe. Of the three views, the first is given here in *alii cum* . . . end of § 68: the second in § 69, *sunt autem quidem*, etc.; and the third in § 70, *sunt autem qui*. The first view, viz. that we ought not to seek our friends' pleasures with as much eagerness as we seek our own, is that of Epicurus himself; the second and third are the views of later Epicureans.

a nostris: *i.e.* the Epicureans, since Torquatus, who is speaking, is an Epicurean.

per se ipsas: *i.e.* the pleasures of our friends purely as pleasures to them, and not as pleasures to ourselves.

quo loco: by which position, *i.e.* by holding this theory.

tuentur tamen: in the previous phrase there is an implied concession: *etsi* or *quanquam stabilitas amicitiae videtur vacillare*.

de quibus ante: see §§ 43–54.

monet amicitias comparare: *moneo* admits of the following constructions: (1) *aliquem de re*; (2) *aliquem aliquid*; (3) *ut*, *ne*, or the simple subjunctive; and (4) an object or relative clause. According to the rule—

> "After *ask*, *command*, *advise*, and *strive*,
> By *ut* translate infinitive"—

we should have expected *ut* with the subjunct.; but instead we have construction (4): "advises the procuring friendships," *comparare* being a kind of accus. after *monet*.

partis: *partis*, the perf. part. pass. of *pario*, to produce, obtain, must be distinguished from *partis*, the genitive of *pars*, a part, and from *partīs*, the 2nd sing. of *partio*, I share.

§ 67. **despicationes**: this word is only found in this passage.

tam amicis quam sibi: "to our friends in the same way as to ourselves." Notice *tam* . . . *quam*, which approximates in meaning to *tum* . . . *quum* = not only . . . but also.

sibi: the use of this word seems strange at first sight, since it does not refer to the subject of the sentence, *amicitiae*, but to the personal subject understood. This use is not uncommon with the pronouns *sui*, *sibi*, *se*, and the pronominal adj. *suus*, both with and without *ipse*.

quodquia: *quod* closely joined to another particle, such as *si*, *nisi*, *utinam*, *ubi*, *quia*, *quoniam*, etc., is a continuative conjunction, and always has reference to something which precedes, and may be translated by "but," "though," etc.

tueri: *tueor* = (1) to look at, behold; and here (2) to look after, protect. From the second meaning we get the adj. *tutus* and the noun *tutor*.

aeque amicos et nosmet: "love our friends equally with ourselves;" the literal translation of the Latin words is "Love our friends equally *and* ourselves (equally)."

hoc ipsum: loving our friends as ourselves.

aeque atque: this is a slight variation on *aeque et*, three lines above.

§ 68. **quosque**: *quos* and *que* has nothing to do with *quisque*, each.

voluptatibus inhaererent: "inhere in pleasure," *i.e.* are founded upon, inseparable from, pleasure.

his paene verbis: Cicero is here translating the words of Epicurus as given in *Diogenes Laert.*, X. 148.

ne quod: notice we have here *quod*, the adjective, and not *quid*, the noun. For the use of *quis* instead of *aliquis* after *ne*, *nisi*, *num*, and *si*, see G. § 383.

§ 69. **sunt autem quidam**: this is the second view of the Epicureans on friendship as understood by some later followers of Epicurus.

convicia: clamour, reproaches, derived probably from *con* and the root of *vox*, a voice.

qui verentur: notice the indic. after *sunt quidam;* it expresses a matter of fact, while the subjunct. would express some degree of uncertainty. Remember the rule that *vereor* or *timeo ne* = I fear that, and *vereor* or *timeo ut* = I fear that . . . not. The explanation of this idiom, as far as *vereor* is concerned, is that *vereor* is from the same root as ὁράω, and originally meant I see, I take care; so *vereor ut faciat* = I take care that he may do it, *i.e.* I fear that he may not do it, and *vereor ne faciat* = I take care that he may not do it, *i.e.* I fear that he may do it.

claudicare: from *claudeo*, *claudus*, lame = to halt, limp, be defective, incomplete. Cf. *vacillare* in § 66. In *De Natura Deorum* both words occur together: *tota res vacillat et claudicat.*

primos congressus: this accus. is the subj. of *fieri*, which is governed by *dicunt* understood.

consuetudinum: *consuetudo* (from *consuesco*) = (1) a custom, habit; (2) usage as a common law, and as here; (3) social intercourse, intimacy.

efflorescere: this is a favourite metaphor of Cicero's; we have a similar one in English. It is noticeable that we have not even a *tanquam* or *quasi* inserted so as to prepare the way.

campum: refers specially to the Campus Martius.

ludicra: used as a noun by Horace also (*Epp.*, I. i. 10); it would embrace what Horace elsewhere enumerates as "jocos, venerem, convivia, ludum." The adj. has no masc. sing. nom.

exercendi: used here intransitively, or we may understand *se;* the gerund, as here, is often used and especially in the gen., instead of the verbal substantive, *e.g. exercitatio*, *venatio.*

adamare: "to begin to love," then "to love exceedingly."

§ 70. **sunt autem, qui**: this is the third view, and, like the second, is the view of a later Epicurean, and not of Epicurus himself.

qui dicant: notice the subjunct. *dicant*, and compare it with the indic. in *sunt quidam qui verentur* in § 69.

† **ut ne**: see G. § 449. Boeckel reads *ne minus quidem*, following one MS.; but though the reduplication of *ut ne* is avoided by this reading, the sense is not improved.

† **saepe evenire videmus**: all the MSS. read *saepe enim videmus*, which makes no sense. Halm's conjecture *evenire* for *enim* makes good sense, and the change is not great. Boeckel, however, prefers *evenisse*, which makes almost better sense, and corresponds more closely with "et saepe *esse factum*" in the similar passage, *De Fin.*, II. xxvi. 83.

rationem: reason or principle of friendship. **institutionem**: establishment, foundation.

§ 71. **sensibus . . . testibus**: for the Epicurean doctrine that the senses were the only reliable guides to knowledge, see *supra*, § 64.

id est: explanatory.

integris: *integer*, from *in* and *tango*—lit. "untouched;" hence uninfluenced, unbiassed; also unadulterated, uninjured, whole.

prosperum . . . asperum: the two contrasted words *prosperum* and *asperum* are probably chosen for their similarity in sound.

comprehenderit: has here a combination of the two ideas of "understanding" and "seizing hold of."

deduceret: not the usual sequence of tenses after *debemus . . . comprehenderit*; but the main idea in the writer's mind is "he grasped . . . in such a way that he led."

parum eruditus: cf. § 26, *supra*.

§ 72. **in poetis evolvendis**: cf. note on *evolutio* in § 25.

Plato: see Introduction.

si . . . conteret: *conterere otium* or *tempus suum* is much more common than *conterere se*. Cf. *De Amic.*, XXVII. 104. "in quibus (studiis) remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus."

numeris, astris: it is not incorrect to say that Plato wasted his time with numbers and the stars; but it is incorrect to say that they started from false beginnings or hypotheses. A mention is made of the science of music and science of geometry, so *numeris* and *astris* are to be taken as the science of number, and the science of the stars or astronomy.

quo jucundius: *quo* is primarily an instrumental abl., and is used instead of *ut* in "final" comparative sentences. See G. § 453.

eas ergo artes persequeretur: the *ergo* has a resumptive force, and serves to show that the main sentence, which has been interrupted by dependent clauses, is now continued. *Persequeretur* is parallel to *tempus consumeret* and *se contereret*, and not parallel with the other subjunctives in the dependent clauses.

perinde: *i.e.* equally fruitful as it is laborious.

non ergo: *ergo* here has its ordinary meaning and use, "therefore," "accordingly;" it is connected with the Greek ἔργῳ.

inquit: it is, perhaps, unnecessary to remind the reader that it is Torquatus who has been speaking since chapter ix. § 29, and expounding the doctrines of Epicurus. He now wishes to hear Cicero's criticism, which is contained in the second book of the *De Finibus*.

INDEX

OF PROPER NAMES.

Afranius (§ 7) : note.
Albucius (§ 8) : note.
Andria (§ 4) : note.
Antiopa (§ 4) : note.
Antipater (§ 6) : note.

Aristippus (§§ 23. 26) : Aristippus, of Cyrene in Africa (*flor.* c. B.C. 370) was a pupil of Socrates (Introd. § 4) and the founder of the Cyrenaic School of Philosophy. It was *Hedonistic*, *i.e.* regarded pleasure as the chief good ; and it was the most consistent of such schools. Unlike Epicurus, who held that pleasure should be foregone if a more than commensurate amount of pain seemed likely to follow (*De Fin.*, I., §§ 38. 48). Aristippus believed in the gratification of μονόχρονος ἡδονή—the pleasure of the moment. Horace thus sums up the bearing of his views (I. *Epp.* I. 18) :—

> "Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,
> Et mihi res non me rebus subjungere conor."

Aristoteles (§§ 6, 7, 14, etc.) : a famous philosopher, born at Stagīrus (or *-a*), in Chalcidice, 384 B.C., was for twenty years a pupil of Plato at Athens, where he subsequently opened a school. He was preceptor to Alexander, King of Macedon, from 342-335. After again sojourning in Athens for some years, he was obliged to leave that city in consequence of a charge of impiety brought against him. He died B.C. 322. The name by which goes his school, the *Peripatetic*, is derived from the fact that Aristotle used to deliver his lectures while he was walking round (περί and πατέω, to walk) the shady walks of the Lycēum (or because he used to deliver his lectures in the περίπατος, or promenade, the name of these walks). His philosophy is essentially practical, and though it loses almost all the idealistic nature of Plato's, it is still not wanting in nobility and sublimity. His works are very numerous and varied, embracing treatises on physics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, criticism, history, natural history, and logic In

logic, or dialectic, he made most important improvements, especially in elaborating the theory of the *syllogism*. In metaphysics he distinguished four causes, *Material*, *Efficient*, *Formal*, and *Final* (see notes on § 18); whereas the old Ionic School had been content to account for things by reference to that *of which* they were made, and even Anaxagoras had only added to this explanation a νοῦς *by which* they were made; Aristotle considered the *how* and *wherefore* of their being. In *ethics* he regarded well-being as the highest good, which he said was attained by the active exercise of our natural powers: virtue he defined as "a habit lying in a mean, between two extreme vices." In *politics* he formed his views from a searching examination of existing politics, and differentiated the functions of government as deliberative, legislative and judicial. In *natural history* he showed appreciation of the necessity of experiment. The acute thinkers of the Middle Ages gave as much weight to his *dicta* as to the words of the Bible.

Athenae (§§ 8, 39).
Atilius (§ 5): note.

Brutus (§ 1): note.
Brutus (§ 12): father of the above; note.

Caecilius (§ 4): note.
Ceramicus (§ 39): note.
Chremes (§ 3): note.
Chrysippus (§§ 6, 39): notes.
Consentini (§ 7): note.
Cyrenaici (§§ 23, 39): see Introduction, § 4. and *s.v.* Aristippus. Amongst them was Euhemerus, who rationalised the Greek myths.

Democritus (§§ 17-21. 28, etc.): Democritus was born at Abdera, in Thrace. B.C. 460. He travelled over a considerable portion of Egypt and various countries in Asia, and after returning to his native land devoted himself to philosophy. He adopted with modifications the system of Leucippus, the founder of the atomic theory. According to Democritus, there is, in the infinite void of space, an infinite number of atoms which, though alike in quality, are different in form. They are impenetrable, and therefore offer resistance to one another; and from their gentle collisions all things are produced. Aristotle was not satisfied with his first cause of all existence, *necessity* (ἀναγκή), *i.e.* the necessary succession of cause and effect. This cause is purely mechanical, and requires no external agent. Similarly material were his views on the soul, which reduced it to a collection of smooth round atoms. In *ethics*, on which he laid little stress, he thought the chief aim of man was peace of mind (εὐθυμία, εὐεστῶ). This corresponds with Epicurus' serenity (ἀταραξία). For the latter's further debts to him see §§ 17-21 and notes. He seems also to have originated two antitheses. (1) between that which exists *by nature* (ἐτέῃ or φύσει) and that which exists by convention

(νόμῳ) ; (2) between the primary and secondary qualities of things. The former powerfully affected Greek thought, the latter was perhaps more enduring.

Diogenes (§ 6) : note.

Electra (§ 5) : note.

Ennius (§ 4) : note.

Epicurei, the followers of Epicurus; see Epicurus.

Epicurus (*passim*) : a celebrated philosopher, born at Samos 342 B.C. After extensive travels he went to Athens in 306, and established himself there, and taught in a garden ; hence his followers were called *The Philosophers of the Garden*. All the other heads of schools, *e.g.* Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, had gone through a long previous training, but Epicurus was self-taught, and to a large extent despised learning (Cicero often—*e.g.* §§ 26, 72—taunts him on account of his ignorance). His ethical system was the same as, or rather a development of, the Cyrenaic, and made pleasure the chief good ; but by making a distinction between higher and lower pleasures (*e.g.* in §§ 55-57) he obviously introduced a standard other than pleasure by which to judge of conduct. Modern Hedonism has passed through a similar stage, in proceeding from Hobbes to J. S. Mill, thus sacrificing logical consistency to morality. Epicurus adopted two other modifications, mutually dependent on one another, of Democritus : his introduction of the *clinamen* (notes, § 19), and his belief in free-will.

Euripides (§ 4) : note.

Homerus (§ 7).

Hortensius (§ 2) : note.

Licinus (§ 5) : note.

Lucilius (§ 7) : note.

Manilius (§ 12) : note.

Medea (§ 4) : note.

Menander (§ 4) : note.

Metrodorus (§ 25) : note.

Mnesarchus (§ 6) : note.

Mucius (§ 10) : see *sub* Scaevola.

Octavius (§ 24) : note.

Orestes (§ 65) : note.

Pacuvius (§ 4) : note.

Panaetius (§ 6) : note.

Persius (§ 7) : note.

Phaedrus (§ 16) : an Epicurean philosopher, and a friend of Cicero. The latter, when he visited Athens in 80 B.C., enjoyed an intimate acquaintance with Phaedrus, who continued from that time until 70 B.C. to be the head of the Epicurean School. In writing his *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero obtained great assistance from the works and lectures of Phaedrus.

Plato (§§ 5, 7): the great Greek philosopher, born at Athens in 429 B.C., was a disciple of Socrates until the death of the latter in 399. After this event he retired to Megara, and then travelled about, visiting Egypt, Sicily, and Magna Graecia. When he returned to Athens, about 389 B.C., he set up a school at the Academy, whence his followers were called *Academics* (see Introduction, *s.v. Academics*). He died 347 B.C. As regards his philosophy, Plato elaborated his dialectical, ethical, and political systems; but, save in his *Timaeus*, laid comparatively little stress on physics. His moral and political philosophy are noble and sublime; perhaps too noble and sublime to be of much practical use. He taught that wisdom was the supreme good, and that the soul was immortal, emanating from the Deity, who was an eternal and self-existent cause, and the origin and creator of everything. It was man's office to be temperate, just, and pure. In *politics* the state as a whole was all-important, the individual being important only as a member of the state. So closely connected are they, that politics and ethics are with Plato almost inextricably interwoven. It was left for Aristotle to distinguish between them, just as he broke up Plato's *Dialectic* into metaphysics, logic, and rhetoric. Plato's great theory is that of the *ἰδέαι*—viz., that the objects which we see (*τὰ φαινόμενα*) are non-existent, but merely copies and emanations from the divine *ἰδέα* or form, which only the soul or intellectual part of our nature is capable of perceiving: hence all knowledge must be innate and acquired by the soul before birth. These *ἰδέαι* formed the "coping-stone" of Plato's system alike in logic, physics, and metaphysics.

Polyaenus (§ 20): note.

Posidonius (§ 6): note.

Rutilius (§ 7): note.

Scaevola, Q. Mucius, *the Augur* (§§ 8, 10): son-in-law of C. Laelius (born about 157 B.C., died not earlier than 88 B.C.), was praetor of Asia in 121 B.C. While on his way to Asia, at Athens, he met T. Albucius, who prided himself so much upon his knowledge and appreciation of Greek language and habits, that Scaevola in chaff addressed him in Greek fashion. Offended by this act, and possibly for some other weightier reasons, Albucius prosecuted Scaevola on his return to Rome for extortion in his province, but the charge was not sustained. Scaevola's family had produced a series of great lawyers, among whom he himself was not the least renowned. He figures as a speaker in the *De Oratore* and several other works of Cicero.

Scaevola, P. Mucius, *the Pontiff* (§ 12): tribune of the plebs B.C. 141, consul B.C. 133. He succeeded his brother Mucianus as Pontifex Maximus in B.C. 131, and died some time after B.C. 121. He was noted for his skill in the *ius pontificium*. Besides being a famous lawyer, he was an eloquent but rather diffuse orator. He also compiled and published in eighty books a digest of the *Annales*

Maximi. His son Quintus (cons. B.C. 95) was also Pontifex Maximus, and did as much for the *jus civile* as his father had done for sacred law: he has been called "the founder of scientific jurisprudence in Rome."

Scipio Africanus Minor (§ 7): note.

Silanus (§ 24): note.

Sophocles (§ 5): note.

Stoici (§ 6): *sub* Zeno.

Synephebi (§ 4): note.

Tantalus (§ 7): note

Tarentinis (§ 7).

Terentius (§ 3): note.

Theophrastus (§§ 6, 14): note, § 6.

Theseus (§ 65): note.

Torquatus, L. Manlius (§ 13, etc.): whose father had been closely connected with Cicero during Cicero's praetorship 65, and consulship 63, belonged to the aristocratical party. He opposed Caesar in 49, joined Pompey, and fought under the latter against Caesar at Dyrrhachium. After the defeat of his party at Thapsus, in 46, he attempted to escape to Spain, but was taken prisoner and slain. He was highly accomplished in every kind of learning, and especially in Greek literature. In philosophy he was a follower of Epicurus, and is the advocate of Epicureanism in the *De Finibus*, the first book of which is called *Torquatus* in a letter of Cicero to Atticus.

Torquatus, T. Manlius Imperiosus (§ 23): note.

Torquatus, T. Manlius (§ 24): note.

Triarius, C. Valerius (§ 13, etc.): one of the speakers in the *De Finibus*. He joined Pompey, who appointed him, together with Laelius, to the command of the Asiatic fleet, in B.C. 48. He perished in the Civil War, probably in Africa.

Veseris (§ 23): note.

Zeno (§ 16): was born at Citium in Cyprus, and came to Athens in 299 B.C. After attaching himself successively to the Cynics, Megarics, and Academics, he eventually opened a school of his own in a porch (στοά) adorned with paintings by Polygnotus. His followers were on this account called STOICS: amongst them were Chrysippus (§ 6) and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. As regards his natural philosophy, there was a primary matter which was never increased or decreased in amount. According to him virtue was the supreme good, and only by means of virtue could man be happy. Temperance and self-denial were to be rigidly practised. He looked upon the deity sometimes as "unconditional necessity," sometimes as the law of nature which accomplished what was right and prevented the opposite. He is thought to have been of Phoenician extraction, and his severe moral earnestness has been put down to this Semitic strain. The Romans were much more in sympathy with this than with the pure intellectualism of the main body of Greek thought; with them the chief Stoic formula was "convenienter naturae vivere."

CICERO DE FINIBUS.

BOOK I.

A TRANSLATION.

(1) I was not unaware, Brutus, that when we were committing to Latin literature those subjects which philosophers of the highest talents and the ripest learning had handled in the Greek language, this work of ours would meet with many kinds of blame. For to certain people—and those, too, by no means unlearned—the whole of this philosophizing is displeasing. Certain people, however, do not blame it so much if it is taken up without too much enthusiasm; but they think that so much zeal and so much pains should not be bestowed upon it. There will be some also—and those, indeed, well educated in Greek Literature, while they despise Latin—ready to say they prefer to spend their efforts in reading Greek. Lastly, I suspect there will be some ready to call me to other branches of literature, and to say that this style of writing, although it be elegant, is not appropriate to a man of character and position.

(2) In reply to all these I think a short answer must be made. And yet to those who assail philosophy as a whole a sufficient reply has been made in that book, in which we defended and eulogised philosophy, when accused and assaulted by Hortensius; and since that book seemed to be approved of by you, and by those who I thought could judge, I undertook a further task, fearing lest I should seem to excite the zeal of men without being able to maintain it. But those who, although philosophy finds the greatest favour with them, yet wish it to be studied with great moderation,

demand a hard kind of self-restraint in a thing which, when once it has been started, cannot be repressed or checked. Hence, we should almost regard the former, who call us altogether away from philosophy, as more just than the latter, who appoint a limit for things unlimited, and yearn for mediocrity in a matter which increases in excellence in proportion to its greatness. (3) For if we can arrive at wisdom, we must not only acquire it, but must enjoy it also. If this is hard, still there is no limit to the search after truth, save its discovery; and weariness in your investigation is base, just because its object is most beautiful. Further, if we are delighted when we write, who is so jealous as to drag us away from it? If we toil in it, who is there to fix a limit to another person's industry? For as Terence's Chremes, who wishes his new neighbour not "to delve or plough, or, in short, to carry anything," is not churlish (for he is frightening him not from proper industry, but from base toil); so those men are meddlesome who are offended by this work of mine, which to me is anything but unpleasant.

II. (4) Therefore it is harder to satisfy those who say they despise Latin writings. And in the case of these, the first thing at which I marvel is this: why in most important matters their native language does not delight them, although they read with pleasure Latin stories translated word for word from the Greek. For who is so hostile—if I may say so—to the Roman name as to despise or fling aside the "Medea" of Ennius, or the "Antiope" of Pacuvius, because he asserts that he is delighted with the same plays of Euripides while he hates Latin literature? "Shall I," says he, "read the 'Synephebi' of Caecilius or the 'Andria' of Terence, rather than the originals of both of them in Menander?" (5) But I differ so much from these, that although Sophocles has written an "Electra" in, perhaps, the best possible manner, still I should think I ought to read the bad translations of Atilius, whom Licinus called "an iron-like writer"—a true remark, I think; but still he is a writer, and one to be read. For to be entirely unversed in our poets is the sign either of the most slothful laziness or of the most superfine fastidiousness. To me, indeed, no people

seem sufficiently educated to whom our literature is unknown. Or do we read

"Would that in the grove not . . ."

none the less than if this very verse were Greek? and shall we, on the other hand, not be pleased that the arguments of Plato, on living a good and happy life, should be expounded in Latin?

(6) Again, what if we do not merely perform the duty of an interpreter, but take to heart the sayings of those whom we approve, and add to them our judgment and our method of writing? What reason have they to prefer Greek to that which is both expressed in lucid style, and is not translated from the Greek? For if they shall say that these subjects have already been dealt with by the Greeks, that is no reason why they should read as many even of the Greeks themselves as are to be read. For among the Stoic doctrines what has been omitted by Chrysippus? Yet we read Diogenes, Antipater, Mnesarchus, Panaetius, and many others, and especially our friend Posidonius. Or, again, does Theophrastus give only a moderate pleasure when he handles topics already handled by Aristotle? Or do the Epicureans refrain from writing according to their own lights about those very subjects on which Epicurus and the Ancients have written? But if the Greeks are read by the Greeks, their works having been composed about the same subjects but on different methods, what reason is there why our writers should not be read by our people?

III. (7) And yet, if I were to translate Plato or Aristotle line for line just as our poets have translated the plays, I suppose I should deserve ill of my countrymen if I were to bring home to their understanding those divine intellects. But I have neither done this up till now, nor yet do I think myself forbidden from doing so. Certain passages, indeed, I shall quote if I think proper, and especially from those whose names I have just mentioned, when it happens that it can be done appropriately: just as Ennius is accustomed to quote from Homer, and Afranius from Menander. Nor indeed will I, as our Lucilius did, refuse to allow all people to read my writings. Would that Persius were living to

read my book; or, better still, Scipio and Rutilius. Lucilius, fearing their criticism, says, "I am writing for the men of Tarentum, Consentia, and Sicily." He was speaking in jest, as usual; but the people for whose criticism he was to polish his work were not so learned then, and his writings are rather light, so that the highest refinement, but only moderate learning, appears in them.

(8) But as for me, what reader am I to fear when I am venturing to address you who are not inferior in philosophy even to the Greeks? And yet I do this, indeed, challenged by yourself in that delightful book which you sent me on Virtue. But I suppose it happens to some that they recoil from Latin writings because they have chanced upon certain uncouth and wretched translations from bad Greek into worse Latin. I agree with them, provided only that they think that not even the Greek originals concerning the same subjects should be read. But who would not read good subjects, expressed with dignity and grace in choice language, unless he be a man that wishes to be called "a perfect Greek," as Albucius was saluted by Scaevola the praetor at Athens? (9) This subject Lucilius also mentions with great elegance and complete wit; in his book Scaevola speaks this splendid passage:—

"You have preferred, Albucius, to be called a Greek rather than a Roman and Sabine, the townsman of Pontius and Tritannius, centurions, renowned men and chiefs and standard-bearers. Therefore, as you have preferred, I, the praetor at Athens, salute you in Greek when you come to me. I say, 'Χαῖρε Titus.' The lictors and the whole squadron and band say, 'Χαῖρε Titus.' For this reason Albucius is my foe, for this reason he is my enemy."

(10) And Mucius (Scaevola) rightly laughed at him. But I cannot help wondering whence comes this haughty disdain for our native products. This is not quite the place to give a lecture; but I feel, and I have often so argued, that not only is the Latin language not poor, as they would commonly think, but is even richer than the Greek. For when have I, or if you like I will say when have either our good orators or poets, been wanting in any adornment of

either rich or elegant language—at any rate after they had some good example to copy?

IV. As for myself, I do not seem by my forensic work, toil, and dangers to have forsaken the post in which I was placed by the Roman people; and so, assuredly, I ought, as far as I am able, to toil in the endeavour, too, that by my labour, zeal, and industry my fellow-citizens may become more learned; and I ought not so much to fight with those who prefer to read Greek (provided that they do read it, and not merely pretend to do so), as pay heed to those who either wish to use the literature of both languages, or if they have their own, are not very anxious for the other.

(11) Those, however, who prefer me to write on other subjects ought not to be unfair to me, inasmuch as I have both written much—possibly more than any other of my countrymen—and I shall perhaps write more if my life holds out; and yet the man who has accustomed himself to read carefully my philosophical writings will be of opinion that no work of mine is more worthy to be read than they are. For what is so well worthy of enquiry as any part of philosophy? and in particular that which is investigated in these books, viz., what is the end, limit, and final object to which, as a standard, are to be referred all designs of living virtuously and acting justly? what does nature pursue as the highest of all desirable objects? what does it avoid as the worst of evils? And since on this subject there is a great diversity of opinon among the most learned, who would think that it is foreign to that dignified position which every one has given to me, to enquire into what is the best and truest good in every walk of life? (12) Shall the question whether the offspring of a slave is to be reckoned among the profits of the master be discussed among the leaders of the state, such as P. Scaevola and M. Manilius; and shall M. Brutus disagree with them (this kind of discussion produces sharpness of wit, and is not useless for the service of our fellow-citizens; and we read, and shall continue to read, with pleasure those writings, and the rest of the same class); and yet shall

those topics, which comprise the whole of life, be neglected? For although the former are more popular, the latter at any rate are more fruitful. This question, however, those who read this work shall be allowed to decide. But I think that this whole enquiry concerning the limits of good and evil has been explained pretty fully by me in that book in which I worked out, as far as I could, not only the doctrine I approved of, but also that which was held by each separate school of philosophy.

V. (13) To begin with the easiest, let the theory of Epicurus, which is very well known by most people, come first before us. You will see that I shall explain it with no less care than that with which it is usually expounded by those very people who approve of that school. For I want to discover the truth, not to refute some one as if he were an opponent. The opinion of Epicurus about pleasure was once defended in detail by L. Torquatus, a man skilled in every branch of learning, and I answered him, when C. Triarius, a young man of especial gravity and learning, was present at that discussion. (14) For as both had come to me at my estate in Cumae to pay their respects, first of all we had a few words among ourselves on literature, about which both possessed the greatest enthusiasm; then Torquatus said, "Since we have at last found you at leisure, I will, at any rate, hear why it is that you, I will not say hate our Epicurus as those who disagree with him generally do, but at least do not approve of the man who, as I think, alone saw the truth, and freed men's minds from the greatest mistakes, and bequeathed to us everything that might bear on living a good and happy life. But I consider that you, like our friend Triarius, are the less pleased with him because he has neglected those elegances of language which are found in Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. For I can scarcely be led so far as to believe that his sentiments should seem to you not to be true."

(15) "See how much you are mistaken, Torquatus," said I. "The language of that philosopher gives me no offence, for he grasps his meaning in words, and speaks plainly that which I may understand; and yet, if a philosopher were to

employ eloquent language I would not despise it from him; if he were not to possess eloquence I would not go the length of clamouring for it. In point of fact, he does not fairly satisfy me, and indeed on several subjects; but 'we cannot all think alike,' so I may be mistaken." "Why, pray," said he, "does he not satisfy you? I think you are a fair judge, provided only that you are thoroughly acquainted with his principles." (16) "Unless you think," said I, "that Phaedrus or Zeno has told me lies—I attended the lectures of both of them, though they proved to me nothing forsooth except their industry—I know sufficiently well all the opinions of Epicurus. And, together with my friend Atticus, I often attended the lectures of those whom I have named, since Atticus indeed admired both of them, and was very fond of Phaedrus; and every day between ourselves we used to compare notes on the lectures, and there was never any argument as to whether I understood, but as to whether I approved of them."

VI. "What is it, then?" said he, "for I desire to hear what it is that you do not approve."

(17) "In the first place," said I, "in natural philosophy, which he especially prides himself, he is, first of all, an entire stranger. He tells you the doctrines of Democritus, making a very few changes; but these changes he makes in such a way that he appears—at least he does to me—to make worse that which he wishes to amend. He thinks that the atoms, as he calls them, *i.e.*, particles indivisible, on account of their solidity are so borne along in the infinite void (in which there is no highest, nor lowest, nor middle, nor inmost, nor outermost point), that by their impact they combine among themselves; hence arises everything that exists and is seen; and he holds that that movement of atoms should be understood to come together from no beginning, but from everlasting time."

(18) In the points in which he follows Democritus, Epicurus is not generally wrong. Now there are in both many things of which I do not approve; but what I especially disapprove of is this: In the natural world we must enquire after two things: (1) the *material* out of which

each thing is made, and (2) the *force* which makes each thing. They discuss the material, but omit the efficient force and cause. This is a fault common to them both; but the following are disastrous mistakes peculiar to Epicurus. For he thinks that those same indivisible and solid bodies are carried straight downwards in a line by their own weight, that this is the natural movement of all bodies. (19) Then the very moment it occurred to him that if all things were carried down perpendicularly, and, as I said, in a straight line, one atom would never be able to come into contact with another, the ingenious man brought in something quite fictitious. He saw that the atom diverged, though in the smallest possible degree, and that thus was brought about that connection, joining, and contact of atoms with one another, by which were made the world and all the parts of the world and all that therein is. The whole thing is a childish invention, and it does not even account for what he wants. For the divergence itself is introduced arbitrarily; he says, in fact, that the atom diverges without any cause, and nothing is less creditable to a physicist than to talk about anything taking place without cause. And, in addition to this, he deprived, without any cause, the atoms of that mode of movement which is natural, as he himself recognised, to all heavy bodies when making direct for a lower position, and yet did not obtain the result for the sake of which he had invented this peculiarity. (20) For if *all* the atoms are to diverge none will ever combine; if *some* are to diverge, whilst others are to move in a straight line at their own will, in the first place this is to assign, as it were, "provinces" to atoms—some to fall perpendicularly, some obliquely; and in the second place, that same disordered concourse of atoms, in respect of which Democritus too gets into difficulties, will not suffice to produce this orderly world.

Then, again, it is not at all like a physicist to believe that anything is the smallest thing—an idea which Epicurus would assuredly never have dreamt of had he but preferred to learn geometry from his friend Polyaenus rather than unteach him as he did. To Democritus, as a well-informed man, and perfect in geometry, the sun seems large—to

Epicurus say a foot across; for he holds it to be as big as it seems, or possibly a little larger or smaller. (21) Thus he spoils what he changes, and what he follows is nothing but the teaching of Democritus—atoms, void, images (what they call εἴδωλα, by whose irruption we not only see but even think): infinity itself (which they call ἀπειρία) is taken from him in its entirety, as are the innumerable worlds which he says daily rise and wane. And though these theories are in no wise proved, yet I would not like Democritus, praised as he is by every one else, to be assailed by the very man who followed him alone.

VII. (22) Again, in the second part of philosophy, which deals with enquiry and discussion, and is called Logic, your friend is, as it seems to me, altogether defenceless and unprotected. He does away with definitions; he gives no instructions about division and classification; he does not tell us how reasoning is conducted and concluded; he does not show in what ways fallacies are detected and ambiguities distinguished. He attributes judgment concerning things to the senses, and if anything false has once been taken as true by them he considers that all means of judging of true and false are removed . . . (23) But he insists, most of all, perhaps, on what nature itself, as he himself says, ordains and approves, *i.e.*, pleasure and pain. To these he refers everything, both what we pursue and what we avoid. And although this is Aristippus' point, and is better and more ingenuously maintained by the Cyrenaics, yet I deem it such that nothing seems more unworthy of a man. For to my mind, nature has produced us and shaped us for something greater. I may be wrong, but I *do* think this, that that Torquatus who first came by this name, neither took away that necklet from the enemy in order to feel any pleasure in his body in consequence of that act, nor fought with the Latins on the Veseris in his third consulship for the sake of pleasure. Nay, in that he smote his son with the axe, he seems to have even deprived himself of many pleasures, since he put the majesty of the state and the government before nature itself and a father's love. (24) And how about that T. Torquatus, consul with Cn. Octavius,

who treated his son with such sternness that when the Macedonian envoys accused the son whom he had taken over from D. Silanus and adopted, because they alleged that as praetor he had taken bribes in his province, he ordered him to plead his cause before himself? Having heard both sides of the case, he declared that his son did not seem to have proved himself such as his fathers had been when in command, and forbade him to come into his presence. Do you think that T. Torquatus took his pleasures into consideration? To omit, however, the perils, toils, and even pain which every good man takes upon him for his country and his friends, so that he not only grasps at no pleasure, but rather passes them all by—prefers, in fact, to face any pains whatever rather than neglect any part of his duty—let us proceed to things which, light though they seem, point no less to the same conclusion.

(25) What pleasure is brought to you, Torquatus, or to Triarius here, by literature, by history, and the knowledge of events, by turning over the leaves of the poets, by so wide a recollection of so much verse? Don't tell me, "Why these are the very things which please me, and which pleased also the Torquati." The point was never thus met by Epicurus or Metrodorus, or any of the school that either had a grain of sense or had learnt those doctrines. And as to the question which is often asked—why so many people are Epicureans—there are many other reasons; but this one has the greatest attraction for the multitude: they think it was said by him that to do for their own sakes the things which are lawful and right is a joy, that is, a pleasure. The most estimable fail to understand that the argument is turned upside down if this be the case. For if it be granted, even though nothing be referred to the body, that what I mentioned are of and in themselves pleasant, it follows that virtue and knowledge of events must be sought for their own sakes. This Epicurus is far from desiring. (26) These, then, I repeat, are the teachings of Epicurus which I reject. For the rest, I would for my part he had either been more versed in learning (for he is, as you must see, not sufficiently cultured in those accomplishments which give their possessors the name of

learned), or had not led away others from their studies. Though you at least I see he has not led away from them at all.

VIII. When I had said this—rather to draw him out than to talk myself—Triarius remarked with a laugh, "Why, you have almost entirely turned Epicurus out of the band of philosophers. What merit did you leave him, save that in whatever way he talked you understand what he said? In physics his teachings are not his own, nor such as to commend themselves to you; if he wished to emend any points in them, he made them worse; he had no system of discussion; when he said that pleasure was the highest good, in the first place he did not see far enough in that very matter, and in the second place it was not original, for Aristippus had taught it earlier and better. At the finish, you added that he was also ignorant." (27) "Well, Triarius," said I, "you cannot possibly help saying what you disapprove of in someone from whom you dissent. For what would prevent me being an Epicurean if I approved what he said, especially as it would be child's play to learn it all? For this reason fault-finding amongst men who think diversely is not to be blamed; but offensive expressions, insults, and persistent anger, wrangling, and quarrelling in discussion always seem to me unworthy of philosophy."

(28) "I entirely agree with you," Torquatus then said; "one can neither argue without finding fault, nor argue aright in anger and obstinacy. But I have something I should like to say in answer to this indictment—unless it weary you." "Do you imagine," said I, "that I should have said what I did had I not wished to hear you?" "Well, then," said he, "am I to run through the whole system of Epicurus, or investigate pleasure only, about which our whole struggle turns?" "That is for you to decide," I said. "This is what I will do," he replied: "I will expound one thing, and that the greatest; and I will discuss the physics at some future time. And I will prove to you both the diverging of the atoms to which you object, and the size of the sun, and that very many mistakes of

Democritus were attacked and corrected by Epicurus. For the present, I will speak of pleasure. What I shall say will not be new, yet I trust such as you will approve." "Assuredly," said I, "I will not be obstinate; and will readily give in my assent to you if you prove to me what you say." (29) "I shall prove it," said he, "if only you are as fair as you look. But I would rather adopt a continuous discourse than the method of question and answer." "As you please," I answered. Then he began to speak.

IX. "In the first place, then," said he, "I shall do as the author of this system is content to do; I will determine the nature and character of what we are investigating, not because I imagine you to be ignorant, but that my discourse may go on logically and systematically. We are seeking what is the last and ultimate good. This, in the opinion of all philosophers, ought to be such that every thing should be referred to it while it can itself be referred to nothing. This Epicurus places in pleasure, which he wishes should be the highest good, and pain the highest evil. He set about teaching this as follows:—

(30) "Every animal, as soon as it is born, has a desire for pleasure, and rejoices therein as the highest good, while it turns away from pain as the highest evil, and puts it as far as it can from itself. This it does before it is corrupted, while nature itself judges innocently and purely. There is, therefore, he affirms, no need of reason or of discussion why pleasure is to be sought for and pain to be avoided. These truths he holds to be felt, as we feel the warmth of fire, the whiteness of snow, and the sweetness of honey: none of which we have to demonstrate with elaborate reasons. It is enough simply to note them. For there is a difference between arguing and the drawing of a conclusion on the one hand, and merely calling attention to and pointing out a thing on the other; by the one hidden and, as it were, involved things are laid bare; by the other things manifest and on the surface are determined. For since we have nothing left us when our senses are taken away, it must needs be that nature itself judges what is in accordance with, or in opposition to, herself. And what does she take,

or what does she decide upon as a test by which either to aim at or avoid any thing? Nothing but pleasure and pain.

(31) "Now, there are some of us who would like to handle this subject with greater preciseness. These say that it is not enough that the senses should judge what is good and what is bad: they assert that by our mind also and reason it can be understood both that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake, and pain avoided for its own sake. And so they say that there is within our minds this natural and innate idea, so to speak, that we feel the one is to be sought, the other shunned. Others, however—and with these I agree—consider that, as many things are said by a number of philosophers to show why neither pleasure is to be classed amongst things good, nor pain amongst things evil, we ought not to trust over much in our case; and they think that we ought to argue and discuss accurately, and debate with well-chosen reasons about pleasure and pain.

X. (32) "But that you may see whence arose all that mistake on the part of those who attack pleasure and praise pain, I will unfold the whole matter, and explain what was actually said by the great Discoverer of Truth, and, as it were, Architect of a Happy Life. For no one despises, hates, or shuns pleasure itself, simply because it is pleasure, but because great pains attend those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally. Further, there is no one who loves, strives for, and wishes to obtain pain itself, simply because it is pain, but because sometimes occasions crop up in which a man seeks by toil and pain some great pleasure. For to come to trifles, who of us takes up any trying bodily exercise, save that he may attain advantage therefrom? And who will rightly blame either the man who would fain be in that state of pleasure which no inconvenience follows, or the man who shuns that pain whereby no pleasure is acquired?

(33) "Yet we both blame and think worthy of just dislike all those who, enervated and corrupted by the allurements of the pleasures of the moment, and blinded by desire, do not foresee what pains and what troubles they will bring on themselves, and commit the like fault with those who

neglect their duties through effeminacy of mind, *i.e.*, avoidance of toils and pains. And between these cases, at all events, it is an easy and straightforward matter to distinguish. At a free moment, when our choice and option is quite open, and when there is nothing to hinder us from being able to do what we most like, all pleasure is to be taken, and all pain is to be cast aside. But on certain occasions, and either through the obligations of duty or the force of circumstances, it will often happen both that pleasures are to be rejected and troubles are not to be declined. And so the wise man adopts in such cases this principle of choice—either in turning his back on pleasures to attain others that are greater, or in enduring pains to put away the more severe ones.

(34) "And holding this opinion as I do, why should I fear lest I be unable to make our Torquati fit in with it? You brought several of them together a moment ago, both accurately and with friendly and amiable reference to myself, but you have not corrupted me by praising my ancestors, nor made me less eager in answering you. How, pray, do you read their doings? Do you really think that they either made an onslaught on an armed foe, or were so cruel to their children and their own blood, without thinking at all of their own profits and advantages? Why, not even the very beasts of the field run and rush about in such a way that we do not understand what is the object of their movements and violence. Do you think that such great men did such deeds without cause? (35) What the cause was I will see anon. Meanwhile I will keep to this: if they did those exploits, which without doubt are illustrious, for any cause at all, virtue for its own sake was not that cause. He dragged the necklet from his foe, you say? Yes, but he protected himself to save his life. But, say you, he went to meet a great danger. Yes, in the sight of the army. Well, and what did he get by that? Praise and love, the best securities for passing life without fear. He punished his son with death. If without cause, I should not like to be sprung from so churlish and savage a man; if, on the other hand, to confirm by his own pain the discipline of military command, and to constrain by fear of punishment the army in

the midst of a serious war, he displayed forethought for the safety of the citizens, with which he was aware that his own was bound up.

(36) "This style of reasoning is open to us all along the line. The arguments on which the declamations of your side—and especially of yourself, who so diligently study the past—are wont mainly to pride themselves, consist in recalling renowned and brave men, and praising their deeds, not with any reward, but with the glory of their goodness itself. But all that is upset when the principle of choice which I have mentioned is established, viz., that either pleasures are let pass for the sake of obtaining greater pleasures, or pains are incurred in return for the avoidance of greater pains.

XI. (37) "Of the notable and glorious deeds of famous men let these remarks be enough. There will shortly be a fitting opportunity for discussing the whole range of virtues in reference to pleasure. For the present I will explain the nature and character of pleasure itself, so that any mistakes of the misinformed may be removed, and that it may be understood how serious, how temperate, and how stern is that system which is commonly reputed voluptuous, soft, and effeminate. For we do not simply pursue that pleasure which by some sweetness stirs our very nature, and is perceived by our senses with some gratification; but we hold that the greatest pleasure which is felt apart from all pain. For since, when we are cut off from pain, we rejoice in the very relief and freedom from all trouble, and since all that wherein we rejoice is pleasure, just as all that whereby we are worried is pain, all relief from pain is rightly named pleasure. For just as when hunger and thirst are driven away by food and drink, the very removal of the discomfort causes the access of pleasure, so in all things the displacement of pain causes a pleasurable effect. (38) Therefore Epicurus was satisfied that there is nothing intermediate between pleasure and pain, for, he thought, that very state which to some seems intermediate, inasmuch as it is free from any pain, was not only a pleasure, but the very highest pleasure. For whoever feels how he

is affected, must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. And Epicurus holds that the highest good is limited by relief from pain, so that afterwards pleasure may be altered and differentiated, but not increased or augmented.

(39) "At Athens, as I used to hear my father say when ridiculing the Stoics with courteous wit, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus sitting with outstretched hand. This hand tells us that he had been delighted with this little puzzle: 'Does your hand, affected as it now is, desire anything?' 'Nothing at all.' 'But if pleasure were a good thing, it would desire it?' 'Such is my belief.' 'Pleasure is, therefore, not a good.' My father used to say that not even a statue would talk like that if it could speak. And the conclusion tells admirably against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if only that were pleasure which—if I may use the expression—tickles the senses, and floods and pervades them with its sweetness, neither the hand nor any part could be content with freedom from pain without a pleasant emotion. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus thought, to have no pain, then what you first allowed, Chrysippus, was right, viz., that your hand desired nothing when it was so affected; what you next conceded—that, if pleasure were a good, your hand would have felt desire—is wrong. It would not feel desire for this reason: to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure.

XII. (40) "Now that pleasure is the last of good things may be seen very easily from this. Let us assume some one enjoying many great and lasting pleasures in mind and body with no pain impeding or impending; what condition, I ask you, could we affirm to be more excellent and more to be coveted than this? A man to be thus situated must have the constancy of a mind which fears neither death nor pain; for death is without feeling, and pain is commonly light when long, and short when sharp, so that its swiftness soothes its greatness, and comfort soothes its lastingness. (41) And when there is added to this the fact that he does not dread the power of the gods, and that

he does not allow past pleasures to pass away, but rejoices in their continual remembrance, what is there which can possibly be added to this condition to make it better? On the other side set some one worn out with mental and bodily pains as great as can overwhelm a man, with no hope before him that things will ever be any easier, and moreover with no present or expected pleasures; what could be said or imagined more miserable than that? But if a life crowded with pains is, above all things, to be avoided, obviously the highest evil is to live with pain; and it is quite in harmony with that opinion that to live with pleasure is the extreme good. For our mind has nowhere to halt as at a goal, but all fears and anxieties are referred to pain; nor is there beyond this any thing which of its own nature can annoy or oppress us. (42) Moreover, the beginning of desiring and avoiding things, and of the conduct of life, generally arise either out of pleasure or out of pain. This being so, it is manifest that all right and estimable things are referred to the possibility of living with pleasure. But that is the highest, ultimate, or extreme good—the Greeks call it τέλος—which is itself referred to nothing, whilst to it everything is referred. It must, therefore, be allowed that the highest good is to live pleasurably.

XIII. "Those who put the highest good in virtue alone and, taken with the brilliancy of a word, fail to understand what nature demands, will be released from a very great error if they will only listen to Epicurus. Who would think those excellent and fair virtues of yours either praiseworthy or desirable unless they caused pleasure? For just as men think highly of the doctor's skill, not for the sake of the art itself, but for the sake of the good health it brings; just as the steersman's art is praised because it comprises the principles of right navigation, for its usefulness and not for its art; so wisdom, which is to be regarded as the art of living, would not be sought after if it effected nothing. As it is, it is sought after because it is, so to speak, the workman for searching out and collecting pleasure. (43) (You now see what I mean by pleasure,

for I do not want my case to break down through antipathy to a word.) The life of men is especially troubled through their ignorance of things good and evil; and by reason of that fault they are often deprived of very great pleasures, and tortured by terrible mental pains. They must, therefore, make use of wisdom, since, by removing terrors and desires, and by stripping away the rashness of all false doctrines, she offers herself to us as the surest of guides. For wisdom is the only thing to drive sorrow from our minds, to suffer us not to shudder with fear: with wisdom as our instructress, the ardour of all desires quenched, it is possible to live in peace. For desires are insatiable; they overthrow men not merely one by one but whole houses, and often cause the entire state to totter. (44) From desires spring hatreds, divisions, strifes, rebellions, wars. And these do not only air themselves abroad, nor do they only rush blindly on others; but within us, shut up in our very minds, they wrangle and wrestle with one another. Hence, of necessity life is made most bitter, so that only the wise man, pruning and cutting down all vanity and error, and content with nature's bounds, can live without anxiety and without fear.

(45) "Now what classification of the desire is more practical and more adapted for living well than that used by Epicurus? He laid down one kind of such desires as were alike natural and necessary; a second, of such as were natural without being necessary; a third, of such as were neither natural nor necessary. The theory of these three is that the necessary ones are satisfied by little effort, and that not heavy. (46) Even the natural desires do not want much, because nature itself has riches, easy to prepare and limited in amount, with which she is contented; but of vain desires there can be found no measure and no end.

XIV. "But, if we see the whole of life thrown into confusion through mistakes and ignorance; if we see that wisdom alone rescues us from the onset of our lusts and from the terror of our fears; teaches us to bear patiently the assaults of fortune itself, and shows all the ways which lead to peace and rest, why should we hesitate to say both that

wisdom is to be sought for the pleasures it brings, and folly to be shunned for the pains it entails?

(47). "In like manner we shall maintain that neither is temperance to be sought for its own sake, but because it brings tranquillity to our minds, and calms and soothes them with a kind of harmony. It is temperance which warns us to follow reason in seeking things or avoiding them. Not that it is enough to decide what is to be done or not to be done; we must also abide by our decision. But most people, because they are unable to hold by, and adhere to, what they have themselves resolved; weakened and overcome by the vision of pleasure which meets them, hand themselves over to be bound by their lusts, and do not foresee what will happen; and therefore, for the sake of a pleasure which is neither large nor necessary, which might be obtained perchance in some other way, and which they could even forego without pain, they fall into dangerous diseases, losses, and shame, and are often made liable to the punishments of the laws and the law-courts. (48) But those who wish to enjoy pleasures only on condition that no pains ensue on their account; those who abide by their judgment, so that they may not be conquered by pleasure, and do that which they feel they ought not to do—these, through passing pleasure by, gain the greatest pleasure. These, also, often even suffer pain, lest, if they do not do so, they should fall into greater pain. Hence it follows that intemperance is not to be avoided for its own sake, and that temperance is to be sought, not because it avoids pleasures, but because it attains greater ones.

XV. (49) There will be found the same explanation for fortitude. The performance of tasks and the endurance of pains are not in themselves attractive; nor are patience, and application, and late working, and industry itself (much praised though it is), and even fortitude. On the contrary, we go through all these that we may live without care and fear, and, as far as we can, free our mind and body from trouble. For as by fear of death every relation of a peaceful life is disturbed; and as it is a sorry thing to give way to pains, and bear them with meek and humble mind,

and by reason of that frailty of mind many have utterly ruined parents, many their friends, some their country, and very many themselves; so, on the other hand, a strong and lofty mind is free from all care and worry when it both despises death—those who are perturbed by death are in like case as they were before their birth—and is so prepared for pains that it remembers that even the greatest pains are ended by death, and that the small ones have many intervals of ease; while of moderate pains we are masters, so that we bear them if they are bearable, and, if not, we calmly pass out of life as out of a theatre, since we are not pleased with it. By all these circumstances is it seen that neither are timidity and cowardice blamed, nor are courage and patience praised, on their own merits; but that the former are cast aside because they produce pain, the latter chosen because they produce pleasure.

XVI. (50) "Justice remains, so that we may have spoken of all the virtues; but much the same can be said about it. I have shown that wisdom, temperance, and fortitude are so linked with pleasure that they can in no wise be wrenched apart or torn asunder therefrom. We must decide similarly about justice. Justice not only never injures any one, but, on the contrary, always imparts by its own strength and excellence something to calm men's minds, as well as by the hope that none of those things will be lacking which an uncorrupted nature desires. And just as folly, and lust, and cowardice always torture the mind, and always vex it, and are harassing, so too wickedness, by the very fact of its presence, is harassing to him in whose mind it takes up its quarters; and if it has achieved anything, however secretly it has done it, it never feels sure that its deed will always be hidden. On the deeds of the wicked, for the most part, comes first suspicion, then common talk and rumour, then the accuser, then the witness; yes, and many too, as in your own consulship, Cicero, have given witness against themselves. (51) Even those who seem to themselves well enough hedged in and guarded from the knowledge of man, dread the knowledge of God, and look on those very anxieties, wherewith by night and by day their minds are gnawed, as

sent them by the immortal gods as a punishment. So, I ask, what help can accrue from wicked deeds towards lessening the troubles of life so great as that which accrues to their increase from the conscience of our misdeeds, as well as by the penalty of the laws and the loathing of our fellow-citizens? Yet with some people there is no limit of money, of rank, of power, of lusts, of feasting, and the rest of the desires, which no plunder wickedly won ever lessens, but rather inflames; it seems they must be checked rather than schooled to the opposite.

(52) "True reason, therefore, draws the truly sane to justice, fairness, and faithfulness. Deeds unjustly done do not profit the man who is powerless over his words and actions; for he can neither effect with ease what he attempts, nor keep his gains if he succeeds. The resources either of fortune or of talent go best with generosity, and those who practise that win for themselves goodwill and—what conduces more than aught else to living peacefully—affection, particularly as men have then no reason to go astray.

(53) "Now the desires which spring from nature are easily and harmlessly satisfied; but those which are vain must not be obeyed. For they crave for nothing desirable; and there is more harm in the injury they cause than benefit in the things which are attained by the harm. And so let no one say that even justice is to be wished for in itself, but only because it brings with it perhaps the maximum of pleasantness. For to be loved and to be dear is pleasant, because it makes life safer and more full of pleasures. And so it is not only on account of those inconveniences which befall the wicked, that we think wickedness is to be shunned, but it is much more because wickedness never allows to breathe or rest him whose mind it haunts. (54) But if not even the merit of the virtues themselves, over which the talk of the rest of philosophers so largely rejoices, can find any definite issue, unless it be referred to pleasure, and if it is pleasure alone that of its own nature calls us to itself, and attracts us, it cannot be doubtful that pleasure is the highest and furthest of all good things, and that to live happily is nought else but to live with pleasure.

XVII. (55) "I will explain in a few words what are the corollaries of this sure and certain opinion. There is no uncertainty as to the actual limits of good and of evil, that is, as to pleasure and pain; but men go wrong regarding them when they do not know whence pleasure and pain arise. Now we confess that the pleasures and pains of the mind are born of the pleasures and pains of the body. Thus I allow what you were saying just now, that those of us fail in their case who think differently; and they are, as I see, many, but only half-taught And we confess that, though mental pleasure brings us joy, and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each of these is sprung from the body and is traced back to the body; and that, none the less, the pleasures and pains of the mind are much greater than those of the body. For with the body we can feel nothing but what is present and with us; with the mind we can feel what is past and what is to come. For though we feel pain equally in mind when we feel pain in the body, yet there can be a great increase of our pain if we fancy that any long and lasting ill hangs over us. And this we can apply to pleasure also; so that it is greater if we fear no such thing.

(56) "And now this much is clear: that the greatest pain or the greatest grief of mind exerts more influence upon a happy or a wretched life than either of them if it be equally enduring in the body. We do not, however, hold that, when pleasure is taken away, affliction at once succeeds, unless pain have stepped into the place of pleasure. On the contrary, we hold that in being free from pains we feel joy, even though there follow no pleasure of a kind to stir the sense; and thus can be realised how great a pleasure it is to feel no pain. (57) But just as we are elated by those good things to which we look forward, so we are made joyous by those which we recall to memory. The foolish are tortured with the memory of ills; but the wise are rejoiced by bygones renewed in pleasant memories. There is something in us whereby we sink what has gone against us in everlasting oblivion, as it were, and retain a sweet and pleasant recollection of what has gone well with us. But when we scrutinise the past with a keen and searching mind, sorrow follows if it be ill, joy if it be good.

XVIII. "Oh! how truly happy is the open, simple, and straightforward life of happy living! For inasmuch as nothing can be better for a man than to be free from all pain and trouble, and to thoroughly enjoy the greatest pleasures of mind and body, do you not see how nothing is left out that aids life, that we may the more easily attain what was set before us—the highest good? Epicurus (whom you aver to have been given over too much to pleasures) insists that we cannot live pleasantly unless we live wisely, honourably, and uprightly; and that we cannot live wisely, honourably, and uprightly without living pleasantly.

(58) "A state cannot be happy in sedition, nor a house in the quarrels of its masters; still less can the mind that is not at unity and harmony with itself taste any part of pure and free pleasure. Indeed, a mind which always adopts plans and pursuits that are divergent and inconsistent can see no peace and quiet. (59) But, if the pleasantness of life is hindered by the more severe diseases of the body, how much more must it be hindered by the diseases of the mind! Now the diseases of the mind are boundless and vain desires for wealth, for glory, for power, and for lustful pleasures. To these are added all sorts of worry, trouble, and grief, which gnaw and kill with care the minds of men who do not understand that the mind should feel pain for nothing (that is, apart from bodily pain), present or future. Yet is there no foolish man who is not harassed by some one of these diseases; and so no foolish man is not wretched.

(60) "To these add death, which always hangs over us as the rock over Tantalus, and superstition. No one who is steeped in this can ever be tranquil. Furthermore, the foolish do not remember the good things of the past; they do not enjoy those of the present; they only look for good things in the future. And as these cannot be certain they are worn out by anxiety and dread, and are most of all tormented when, too late, they feel that it is in vain that they have set their hearts on money, or rule, or riches, or glory. For they attain none of the pleasures which they were burnt up with the hope of acquiring, and for which they

had undertaken many mighty labours. (61) Then, too, see how some are insignificant and narrow-minded, or always despairing or malicious, envious, morose, workers in darkness and speakers of evil, and sullen; how others are given up to amorous trivialities; how others are fretful, others foolhardy and wanton, and at the same time intemperate and cowardly, and changeable of mind. And by reason of these things there is, in their life, no respite from trouble. Wherefore, neither of the foolish is there any that is happy, nor of the wise any that is unhappy. We say this better and more truly than any of the Stoics; for they say that nothing is good except that shadow, as it were, which they call "the good"—a name less stable than imposing; and they say that virtue, resting on this "good," needs no pleasure, and is of itself enough for living happily.

XIX. (62) "Yet in one way these statements can be made, not merely without disgusting us, but even with our approval. For the ever happy wise man is thus introduced by Epicurus: he has limited desires, recks not of death, fearlessly feels the truth concerning the immortal gods, and does not hesitate, if it be better so, to abandon life. Equipped with these qualities, he is always in a state of pleasure; nor, indeed, is there any time when he has not more pleasures than pains. For he has both an agreeable memory of the past and such a hold on things present as to be well aware how great they are and how pleasant. And he does not depend upon the future, but looks forward to it. He enjoys the present, and is far removed from those vices which I just now grouped together. When he compares the life of the foolish with his own he experiences a great pleasure. If, however, any pains *do* crop up, they never have so much force that the wise man does not have more reason to rejoice than to grieve.

(63) "Epicurus spoke admirably when he said that fortune interfered very little with the wise man; that matters of the greatest and most serious moment were managed by him on his own responsibility and judgment; and that no greater pleasure could be got from an infinite period of

time than we get from that period which we see to be finite. In that logic of yours he thought there was no force either for living better or for arguing more to the point. He put most stress on physics. In that branch of knowledge the force of words, the character of an exposition, and the arguments of people maintaining or rebutting a theory, can all be readily followed; and when we know the nature of all things we are liberated from superstition, we are freed from the fear of death, we are not distraught by our ignorance of things—from which alone awful terrors often take their being; in a word, we shall also be more moral when we have learnt what nature calls for. In fine, if we hold fast to a sound knowledge of things, maintaining that rule which seems to have come down from heaven for the cognition of all things, and by which all our judgments about things are guided, we shall never be convinced by the arguments of any one, and abandon our belief.

(64) "But if the nature of things has not been understood we shall in no way be able to defend the judgments of the senses. Nay, more: whatever we perceive with the mind all springs out of the senses; and it is only if these are all true, as Epicurus' theory teaches us, that anything can be perceived and known. Those who do away with the senses, and say that nothing can be perceived, cannot, having put the senses aside, even account for the very fact that they discuss. Moreover, with the removal of cognition and knowledge is removed also every method of life and action. And thus from physics is derived fortitude against the fear of death, firmness against religious awe, calmness of mind when ignorance of things hidden is done away with, and moderation when the nature and kinds of desires are revealed; and, as I just now told you, by the rule of cognition, and by the method of judgment established by the same great man, the distinction between true and false is imparted to us.

XX. (65) "There remains the topic which is perhaps the most essential to this discussion. I mean friendship, which you assert will never exist at all if pleasure be the highest good. About friendship Epicurus says this: that

of all the things that wisdom has furnished towards living happily none is greater than friendship, none is more fruitful, none more pleasant. And this he showed forth not only in speech, but to a still greater extent in his life, doings, and habits. How great a thing friendship is, the mythical tales of the ancients declare; in the large and varied collection of which, tracked back to the farthest antiquity, scarce three pairs of friends are found, though you should start with Theseus and go down to Orestes. Yet Epicurus in his own home, and that a small one, had great crowds of friends agreeing together in all the harmony of love. And this practice is now kept up by Epicureans. But let us return to the point: we need not speak of men.

(66) "I see, then, that our school has discussed friendship in three ways. Some maintained that those pleasures which related to friends should not be sought for their own sake so keenly as we seek our own. And though the stability of friendship seems to some to totter when this position is taken up, yet its supporters hold their ground, and easily extricate themselves from difficulty. At least, *I* think they do. For as with the virtues of which we have previously spoken, in the same way they affirm that friendship cannot be dissociated from pleasure. For since loneliness and life without friends is full of snares and apprehension, reason itself urges us to make friendships; and by the acquisition thereof the mind is strengthened, and cannot be secluded from the hope of acquiring pleasures.

(67) "And just as ill-will, hatred, and contempt are opposed to pleasures, so friendships are not only the faithful partizans, but also the producers of pleasures, alike to one's friends and to oneself; and we do not only enjoy such as are present, but we are lifted up with hope for the time that is to follow and to come. But because we can in no wise keep up a sure and lasting pleasantness of life without friendship, and because we cannot preserve that friendship unless we esteem our friends as much as ourselves, for that very reason this last is brought about in friendship, and friendship is bound up with pleasure. For we both rejoice in the joys of our friends as much as in our own, and feel pain equally at their sorrows. (68) A wise man, therefore, will be

disposed towards his friend somewhat in the same way as towards himself, and will undertake for the sake of a friend's pleasure the same toils as he would undertake for his own pleasure. And what has been said of the virtues—how they are invariably all blended with pleasures—is to be likewise said with regard to friendship. Epicurus puts it very well in some such words as these: 'The same opinion strengthened the mind, so that it feared no long or lasting ill, as that which observed that in the narrow limits of our life the firmest safeguard was that of friendship.'

(69) "Secondly, there are some Epicureans, slightly more in awe of your attacks, but sharp enough withal, who fear that if we regard friendship as to be sought for our own pleasure's sake, the whole of friendship seems to stumble. And so they assert that the first meetings and unions and inclinations towards starting an intimacy are made for our own pleasure's sake; but that when advancing acquaintance has produced familiarity, the affection bursts into such flower that the friends love one another for their own sake, even if no profit flow from their friendship. For if we get to like, as we generally do, places, shrines, cities, gymnasia, the Campus Martius, dogs, horses, and other amusements by force of habitual exercise and hunting, how much more easily and rightly will this be possible in associating with our fellow-men?

(70) "Thirdly, there are some to say that there is a kind of compact amongst the wise not to love their friends less than themselves. And this we are aware can happen, and we often see it coming about; and it is manifest that nothing can be found more adapted for living pleasantly than such a fellowship. From all these things it can be inferred not only that the grounds of friendship are not hampered if the highest good be fixed in pleasure, but that without that doctrine there can be found no beginning of friendship at all.

XXI. (71) "Wherefore, if what I have said is brighter and clearer than the sun itself; if all I have said is drawn from the spring of nature; if my whole speech strengthens all confidence in it by the help of the senses, that is, by the

help of pure and uncorrupted witnesses; if children who cannot yet talk, and voiceless beasts, almost cry out, at the teaching and lead of nature, that nothing is agreeable but pleasure, nothing disagreeable but pain—and their decision is due neither to wickedness nor to corruption—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who, hearing the cry of nature as it were, firmly and gravely understood it, so as to lead all who are truly sane into the way of a soothed, quiet, peaceful, and happy life?

"As to Epicurus seeming to you deficient in learning, the reason is simply that he thought nothing was learning save that which helped on the training of a happy life. (72) Was he to spend his time in turning over the leaves of poets, wherein there is no solid profit, and all delight is but childish, as, at your instigation, Triarius and I do? Was he to waste his time, as did Plato, in music, mathematics, arithmetic, and astronomy, which, starting as they do from false beginnings, cannot be true, and which, even if they were true, would contribute nothing whereby we may live more pleasantly, that is, better? Was he, I repeat, to follow those arts, and leave aside the art of living, so great, so difficult, and so thoroughly rich in results? Epicurus, then, was not unlearned; but those are untaught who think that those things are to be learned even up to old age which it is disgraceful not to have learnt whilst boys."

When he had thus spoken, "I have expounded," he said, "my belief, and that with the design of learning your opinion. No opportunity for doing that at my own will has been heretofore given me."

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